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FORUM ON THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY

Anthropology’s Science Wars
Insights from a New Survey
by Mark Horowitz, William Yaworsky, and Kenneth Kickham
In recent decades the ﬁeld of anthropology has been characterized as sharply divided between proscience and antiscience factions. The aim of this study is to empirically evaluate that characterization. We survey anthropologists in
graduate programs in the United States regarding their views of science and advocacy, moral and epistemic relativism,
and the merits of evolutionary biological explanations. We examine anthropologists’ views in concert with their varying
appraisals of major controversies in the discipline (Chagnon/Tierney, Mead/Freeman, and Menchú/Stoll). We ﬁnd that
disciplinary specialization and especially gender and political orientation are signiﬁcant predictors of anthropologists’
views. We interpret our ﬁndings through the lens of an intuitionist social psychology that helps explain the dynamics of
such controversies as well as ongoing ideological divisions in the ﬁeld.

Controversy beckoned in 2010 when the leadership of the
American Anthropological Association (AAA) proposed removing reference to “science” in its long-term plan. The “science
wars” of the nineties were a not-so-distant echo, after all, and yet
the scope of the response was unexpected. Writing in the New
York Times shortly thereafter, science journalist Nicholas Wade
(2010) suggested that the decision reopened a “long-simmering
tension” among anthropologists, whose science-oriented and
activist “factions” experienced a phase of “bitter tribal warfare.”
Alice Dreger (2010) echoed Wade’s construal and did not hesitate to take sides. Decrying the AAA’s view of science as a “fourletter word,” Dreger faulted those she dubbed “ﬂuff-head” cultural
anthropologists prone to appear as “superheroes for oppressed
peoples.” The danger for the “real scientists” (including some
“non-ﬂuff-head” cultural anthropologists) is a climate within
the discipline that “actively denigrates science” as just “another
way of knowing” and “promotes activism over data collection and
scientiﬁc theorizing” (Dreger 2010).
As the storm surged into the blogosphere, anthropologists
raised the alarm. Peter Wood (2010) warned in the Chronicle of
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Higher Education about a “self-appointed radicalizing faction”
threatening the discipline. Shorn of its scientiﬁc basis, anthropology would become, Wood feared, “little more than colorful
travel literature (travelogues) occasionally mixed up with political hucksterism and theoretical obscurantism.” Peter Peregrine, president of the Society for Anthropological Sciences,
emailed group members about the troubling development and
shared their resolution condemning the abandonment of the
ﬁeld’s core principles.
While sensationalized as an “implosion of anthropology”
(Rosenberg 2010) or disciplinary “civil war” (Hartwell 2010),
the AAA executive board sought to defuse matters and reached
out to association leaders. In its formal response, the leadership
stressed that changes to the long-term plan were blown out of
proportion by media misrepresentations, which gave the mistaken impression of a ﬁeld divided. Indeed, they underscored
their endorsement of the scientiﬁc method as “crucial to much
anthropological research,” noting that the changes were never
intended “to signal a break with the scientiﬁc foundations of
anthropology.” Executive board member Hugh Gusterson followed suit in a joint radio interview with Peregrine (Lehrer
2010). He rejected the characterization of an antiscientiﬁc current among anthropologists. “This is an unfortunate exhumation of a battle that ended a decade ago,” Gusterson remarked,
noting that there was a time in the nineties when postmodern
scholars embraced the “social construction of knowledge”—
but that “those days have ended” (Lehrer 2010). He added that
“many activist-oriented anthropologists” who are drawn to
advocacy today actually “embrace science.”
Peregrine was unmoved. “There is a real division within
the organization,” he stressed, one that has marginalized evolutionary anthropologists in particular. Peregrine contrasted
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those anthropologists who seek to explain widespread cultural
variations—generally through a biocultural lens—with those
more inclined to description and understanding of cultural
particularity. “There is a subgroup of descriptive interpretive
anthropologists,” he asserted, “who do aggressively attack
scientiﬁc approaches.” Indeed, it is precisely this “very deep
rift” in the ﬁeld that has made the battle over its mission “rage
the way that it has” (Lehrer 2010).
One scholar who has fallen into perhaps the deepest depths
of that rift is Napoleon Chagnon. If not the most maligned
anthropologist in memory (Eakin 2013), Chagnon’s research
among the Yanomami has certainly polarized the anthropology
community. We address the Chagnon controversy centrally in
our survey. Sufﬁce to note here that he has not shrunk from
calling out what he sees as antiscientiﬁc attitudes among his
colleagues. In the ﬁnal pages of his provocative memoir, Chagnon (2013) chimes in regarding the AAA mission ﬂap. He laments that in the past 20 or so years, cultural anthropology has
come “precipitously close to abandoning the very notion of
science.” In his view, there is indeed a schism between anthropologists who “do science” and those whose exclusive goal is
to “advocate on behalf of native peoples.” The latter are not just
wrong, Chagnon contends, but also “border on irresponsibility,”
as they deﬁne their advocacy as “incompatible with science.”
Moreover, Chagnon echoes Peregrine in linking anthropology’s
emphasis on postmodernism and advocacy to a deep current of
“biophobia”—a “chronic opposition in cultural anthropology to
ideas from biology” that may “help account for what humans in
all cultures did.”
Disciplinary harmony is hardly expected in academia and
perhaps less so in four-ﬁeld anthropology. Yet here we have a
ﬁeld allegedly fractured over the very foundations of scientiﬁc
practice, objectivity, and ethical responsibility. Are such characterizations accurate? Is anthropology in fact divided into demonstrably proscience and antiscience factions? Do postmodern sentiments endure in the discipline, undermining scientists’
commitment to objectivity and capacity for dispassionate approximations to truth? We examine these questions and more
with an eye to anthropologists’ political identities. We hope, in
this regard, to bolster a moral intuitionist interpretation of knowledge production proposed in prior research.1 We will turn to
our survey in a moment, but ﬁrst let us sketch the normative

1. We build here on former investigations of controversies in sociology,
economics, and evolutionary anthropology (Horowitz and Hughes 2017;
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham 2014; Yaworsky, Horowitz, and Kickham 2015). Our aim is to contribute to a social psychology of knowledge in
the social sciences. We take a social-psychological rather than a traditional
“sociology of knowledge” approach in that the latter tends to highlight wider
historical and cultural forces that shape knowledge production from without. We suggest a complementary social-psychological approach that attends “bottom up” from scholars’ moral intuitions (and consequent political
identities) to their often “tribal” constructions of knowledge. We unpack
these ideas in further detail in our discussion below.
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tenor of the ﬁeld’s major debates to provide context for our
chosen questions.

Construing the Postmodern Turn
Characterizing a movement or moment as postmodern is a
dicey undertaking. Whether we attend to the boundaries of
anthropology or beyond, the postmodern turn means many
different things to observers of many different shades of sympathy, suspicion, or antipathy. Reﬂecting on his role in the
meteoric Writing Culture, Clifford (2015:25–31) suggests that
the text “imperfectly registered” anticolonial and feminist sensibilities. Set against the backdrop of a late 1960s to early 1990s
“transitional moment,” Clifford describes a chastened insurgent outlook that replaced “frontal resistance to hegemony”
with “subversion,” “critique,” and the clearing of space for “discrepant senses of the real” (25–31).
This decentering of hegemonic truth claims toward an
“epistemological diversity,” as Clifford puts it, is dissected by
Marcus and Fischer (1996) in their widely cited discussion
of the “crisis of representation” in the human sciences. No
longer conﬁdent in grand theoretical explanations—and ever
attentive to power relations and discursive contexts—interpretive ethnographies would supplant generalizing explanatory frameworks in an avowedly contingent social world.
Stocking captures the mood perhaps best in his depiction of
an increasingly self-reﬂexive, ﬁn de siècle anthropology:
Ideologically, it would move beyond the liberal posture of
relativistic tolerance towards one of radical engagement in
the struggles of the powerless against the holders of power.
Methodologically and epistemologically, it would reject the
positivistic assumption that cultures or cultural behavior could
be observed as “objects” in the external world, and recognize
the essential reﬂexivity of participant observation, and the
inherently problematic character of the knowledge generated
by the ethnographic process. (Stocking 1995:65–66)

Stocking refers to anthropology’s “relativizing critique” of
science over three decades, as well its “debiologizing” and
historicizing tendencies throughout the century. The many
permutations in the debate over the politics of representation
exceed our scope here. Yet we see in our brief sketch that the
twin concerns of political responsibility in a stratiﬁed world
and suspicion of authoritative representations of that world
(especially by Western observers) have long preoccupied anthropologists. Indeed, the spirit of such concerns appears to
animate some of the most vivid controversies in the ﬁeld.

Moral Readings and Epistemological Angst
Machetes, Menchú, and Mead
Anthropological controversies over the years often occasion
what Segerstrale (2000) calls “moral reading.” When a text or
theory is read morally, it is considered in terms of the typically baneful political consequences it allegedly causes. Such
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normative critique may call out an author’s hidden ideological agenda or hold them accountable for how their ﬁndings
are used in the wider political arena.
Chagnon’s work is prototypical in this regard. Shortly after
publishing his 1988 Science article linking male violence to
marital and reproductive success among the Yanomami, the
Brazilian Anthropological Association sent a letter to the AAA
ethics committee alerting North American anthropologists to
the danger (Carneiro da Cunha 1989). The letter condemned
Chagnon’s misrepresentations of Yanomami violence, which
were appropriated in the press by political and mining interests
bent on exploiting the region’s land and resources. Similarly,
Chagnon’s behavior in the ﬁeld has been subject to withering
critique. Most famously, Marshall Sahlins condemned Chagnon’s ethical breaches in obtaining genealogies from a people
deeply reticent about revealing the names of the dead. Sahlins
(2000) denounced Chagnon’s use of “draconian devices” to solicit names, from “bribery” and trading of machetes and other
goods to “exploiting animosities” in the villages (much of which
Chagnon acknowledges in his writings). For Sahlins and other
critics, Chagnon helped instigate the very violence he would
later use in stereotyping the Yanomami as “ﬁerce.” All of this
was done, Sahlins lamented, “for the sake of science”—despite
the irrevocable “pain and hate” visited upon the Yanomami.2
Criticism of Chagnon’s research has not been limited to its
purported moral offenses or political misuses. Scientiﬁc and
empirical challenges abound. Above all, critics contest his sociobiological account of the roots and extent of Yanomami violence. Ferguson (1995a, 2015) highlights broader historical
factors in shaping patterns of violence—particularly Western
colonial inﬂuence through proximity to trade in highly sought
steel tools. He and others dispute Chagnon’s statistics as well,
especially his data on unokai “killers”—dismissed by Sahlins
(2000) as having perhaps the “shortest half-life” of any study in
Science—as well as the nature and rate of female abductions
(e.g., Albert 1989; Lizot and Dart 1994). In the end, Chagnon’s
critics paint what they see as a more balanced picture of Yanomami aggression, attentive to historically speciﬁc causes in
no way attributable to an allegedly primordial Hobbesian past.
Our report does not aim to adjudicate conﬂicting claims in
this or other controversies. We submit, however, that disentangling the empirical and the normative in these debates is

2. Sahlins would later resign from the National Academy of Sciences,
partly in protest over Chagnon’s election. Chagnon’s critics cheered the
move. Perhaps the most caustic (and colorful) criticism was penned by
David Graeber, who suggested that Chagnon “viliﬁed a group of human
beings so that enormous violence could be unleashed on them.” Graeber
continued by afﬁrming that Sahlins is a “man of genuine principle,” who
“never had a lot of patience for shirtless macho Americans who descend
into jungles declaring their inhabitants to be violent savages, and then
use that as an excuse to start behaving like violent savages themselves—
except with command over inﬁnitely greater technological resources”
(cited in Golden 2013).
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tricky, not least because they implicate authors’ moral intuitions
and “emotive communities” (more on this below). We hope
nonetheless that our sketch of the social psychological aspects of
such controversies contributes to greater self-consciousness in
the ﬁeld, perhaps aiding deeper consensus on vital empirical
matters down the road.
Although hardly as tenacious as the Chagnon saga, David
Stoll’s (1999) exposé of the testimonio of famed Guatemalan
activist Rigoberta Menchú certainly piqued passions. Stoll discovered several claims in her narrative that did not square with
the facts (e.g., that Menchú was illiterate and received no
formal education, that wealthy ladinos sought belligerently for
decades to steal her family’s land, and that she witnessed the
immolation of her brother by the Guatemalan army). Stoll
contested many such claims, citing archival records and scores
of interviews with neighbors and extended family. Perhaps
most contentious was his broader challenge to Menchú’s
portrayal of widespread peasant provocation and support of
the guerrilla movement.
Stoll’s book and consequent New York Times reporting
(Rohter 1998) were embraced by far-right observers as vindication of Menchú’s mendacity (D’Souza 1998; Horowitz 1999).
Progressive and academic responses were far from friendly to
Stoll, however, as moral readings snowballed (Arias 2001). Pratt
(2001) rebuked Stoll’s “hubris,” asking how, in light of the Guatemalan army’s “monstrosities” and the US government “complicity,” one could have “an ethical compass whose point of orientation is not these truths but the truth that Menchú was not
present when they killed her brother or that she does not discuss her family’s internal quarrels” (Pratt 2001:43–46). Sommer (2001) added that Stoll was “probably right to quibble over
Rigoberta’s facts,” yet asked why he “wants to shift attention
away from the genocidal war waged by the Guatemalan government against its indigenous population” (239).
While some challenged the validity of Stoll’s ﬁndings—accusing him of cherry-picking his sources or questioning their
veracity—a more common response was to raise larger epistemological questions about the nature and intent of testimonio.
Attentive to the “geopolitics of truth” (Pratt 2001), the genre
became framed as a collective political enterprise, representing
plural and marginalized voices rather than a single “objective”
truth privileged by Western academics (Fermin 2001; Smith
2001). The arguments in this vein tend to be subtle, if not opaque,
prompting critics to dismiss them as “postmodern obfuscations”
(Patai 2001:273). Hence Pratt (2001) writes that “marginalized
groups are insisting on entering into dialogue with lettered
knowledge, from alternative epistemological grounds;” testimonio has “undermined the hierarchy” of “lettered knowledge over
narrated experience;” and “despite the metropolitan cult of the
fact, it is common in everyday practice that verisimilitude counts
as veracity” (41–43). Smith (2001) concurs by stressing “new
ways” of seeing “truth and responsibility” that welcome diverse
“positions and positionalities” (151–152). Yet “Stoll’s very positionality,” she cautions, represents “the illusory truth of ‘objective’ reportage” (Pratt 2001:151–152).
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While calls for multivocality shorn of the pursuit of objectivity strike us as paradoxical—and we are wary of alternative
epistemological grounds that are left unspeciﬁed—we will hold
our reﬂections on questions of power and epistemology for our
concluding discussion. Here we step back from the polemics to
take stock of the ﬁeld. Does distrust toward scientiﬁc objectivity
characterize contemporary anthropology? Is such epistemic
relativism more preponderant in cultural anthropology than in
the other subﬁelds? Are there demographic factors that may
inﬂuence variation in anthropologists’ views?
The third and no doubt most famous controversy addressed
in this survey is Derek Freeman’s (1983, 1999) challenge to
Margaret Mead’s classic research on adolescence in Samoa.
Without belaboring the details of this familiar drama, sufﬁce to
note that the claims and counterclaims about Samoan life were
politicized right out of the gate. As Shankman (2009:210) notes
in his absorbing overview, Freeman’s book found a receptive
audience among conservatives in the context of the culture wars
of the eighties. His purported debunking of Mead’s allegedly
ideological embrace of cultural relativism was welcome news to
those who viewed moral laxity as the prime culprit of societal
ills. Moreover, the ﬂedgling ﬁeld of sociobiology found the
characterization of Mead as an antievolutionary cultural determinist an inviting foil, as they sought to deepen the scientiﬁc
heft of their budding program. Popular evolutionary psychologists such as Steven Pinker, David Buss, and Matt Ridley would
echo aspects of Freeman’s critique, including his claim that Mead
was duped by a couple of her Samoan informants (Shankman
2009:207–210). As Shankman shows through careful research,
however, Freeman’s portrayal of Mead entailed substantial
cherry-picking from her writings, consistently omitting her references to biological determinants of behavior, an ironic ﬁnding
given Freeman’s critique of Mead’s ideologically driven agenda.3
However one-sided Freeman’s representation of Mead, it is
evident that the Mead/Boas legacy is typically evoked in terms of
its moral relativist critique of old Eurocentric claims of biological and cultural superiority. Indeed, Mead’s career embodies a
tension still visible in anthropology today—a passionate commitment to advocacy and human rights coupled with hesitancy,
given the legacy of colonialism, to privilege Western society’s
norms or values over those of others. For critics of moral relativism today, however, what was once a corrective to colonial
racism has become a logically self-refuting and politically irresponsible position (see, e.g., Bagish 1981; Harris 2010).4
To be sure, questions of relativism, advocacy, and ethical
responsibility endure in the ﬁeld (e.g., Abu-Lughod 2002;
3. In his new afterword to the 2016 edition of The Blank Slate, Pinker
acknowledges (following his reading of Shankman) that his uncritical
repetition of Freeman’s claims needs to be “modiﬁed.”
4. Harris (2010:221) refers to what he sees as widespread moral relativism among liberal intellectuals as a kind of “learned pathology.”
Hardly mincing words, he condemns the AAA’s well-known statement
to the United Nations in 1947—widely seen as an endorsement of relativism—as “the best the social sciences could do in the United States
with the crematoria of Auschwitz still smoking” (221).
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D’Andrade 1995; Scheper-Hughes 1995; Shweder 2000). We
will hardly resolve such matters in this study. We are surprised, however, that our survey appears to be the ﬁrst to attempt to gauge the ﬁeld as a whole on these issues. We question
anthropologists candidly and in straightforward language,
querying them as well on controversial recent research revisiting the explosive category of race (Cochran, Hardy, and
Harpending 2006).

Methods
Survey Sample and Questions
We compiled a list of 1,632 anthropologists in all doctoral
anthropology programs in the United States using AAA’s
AnthroGuide 2013–2014. We included additional faculty on
departmental websites and eliminated all invalid, repeating,
or unveriﬁable emails, for a revised list of 1,553 professors.
After an email and follow-up in October 2016, we received
301 usable surveys, for a 19% response rate.5 We hope that
our focus on faculty in doctoral programs affords a glimpse
into the likely direction of the ﬁeld, given their role in training future anthropologists. Table 1 reports relevant characteristics of our sample, including demographics and respondents’ self-identiﬁed political orientations.
Substantively, our survey addresses questions grouped into
the following four thematic categories: (1) science and epistemology, (2) moral relativism and advocacy, (3) biology and
culture, and (4) controversial legacies. Table 2 lists the questions.
As can be seen, we crafted the questionnaire while being attentive to the aforementioned splits over epistemology, activism, and the merits of evolutionary biology. Respondents were
asked Likert-type items, that is, whether they “strongly agree,”
“agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” or “strongly
disagree” with the 38 statements.6 We are cognizant that formulating workable survey questions often invites objections,
especially with regard to controversy, so we aimed in our framing to use as familiar and unambiguous language as possible. We
begin here with an overview of the ﬁndings of the ﬁeld as a
whole, then turn to interpretation of salient and indeed surprising patterns in the data.

Findings
A Bird’s-Eye View of the Field
Table 3 provides a description of anthropologists’ overall responses. The ﬁndings at this level of generality are simple yet
offer a useful springboard to explore obvious points of consensus or division.

5. Note that we had 342 original entrants, with 41 electing not to answer a single substantive question (beyond demographics).
6. These include six speculative “Biology and culture” questions (BC5–
BC10) that ask respondents to gauge the “plausibility” or “implausibility”
of the respective items.
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Table 1. Sample characteristics of anthropologists
Characteristics
Gender:
Female
Male
Age:
30–45
46–61
621
Subdiscipline:
Archaeology
Biological
Cultural
Linguistic
Academic rank:
Assistant professor
Associate professor
Professor
Political orientation:
Radical
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Libertarian

Respondents (n p 301)

Percent

126
172

42
58

81
120
97

27
40
33

93
70
118
9

32
24
41
3

46
91
142

16
33
51

37
213
36
2
3

13
73
12
1
1

Note. The table leaves out a modest number of missing cases across
categories.

We see in items SE1 and SE2 that anthropologists in our
sample overwhelmingly afﬁrm the value of science to society,
with strong majorities agreeing that science improves human
well-being (89%), and that the voices of scientists should be
heeded in government policy (86%). Moreover, only a small
fraction (13%) afﬁrms that the AAA’s 2010 proposal to remove
“science” from its long-term plan was a worthy aim. Such
views should give pause to facile characterizations of the ﬁeld
as antiscience.
With regard to epistemology, however, the picture muddies.
Here we see sizable minorities of anthropologists agree that
traditional indigenous cosmologies are “no less ‘true’ than modern scientiﬁc explanations” (31%) and that science is “just
one way of knowing, no more valid or accurate than other
approaches to knowledge” (22%). Although a solid majority of
respondents (67%) concur that the best scientiﬁc theories provide “truthful representations of reality,” fewer than half (47%)
reject the view that anthropologists’ depictions of indigenous
cultures “reﬂect more their own power and interests” than
“ ‘true’ descriptions of those cultures.” Although we cannot attend to every question here, the ambivalence of the ﬁeld regarding epistemology is unmistakable. In fact, modest majorities afﬁrm both that postmodern theories make an “important
contribution to the ﬁeld” (60%) and that “antiscientiﬁc attitudes” are undermining the discipline (54%).
Questions of moral relativism reveal greater consensus.
Eighty-nine percent of respondents support the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and 72% personally view female genital
mutilation as “brutal and unethical” wherever it is practiced.
Only about one-sixth of the ﬁeld (18%) believes that the
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procedure should not be condemned by Western anthropologists. These ﬁndings render hyperbolic claims by critics such
as Harris (2010) that the ﬁeld is muddled in an allegedly obtuse moral relativism.
Considerations of advocacy divide the ﬁeld, however. Fiftyfour percent of anthropologists afﬁrm their ethical responsibility to “stand in solidarity with the marginalized groups
they study.” Fifty-two percent reject the view that the AAA
should avoid “politically oriented” resolutions or boycotts. And
last, anthropologists are about evenly divided over whether
advocacy and ﬁeldwork should be kept separate to protect the
“objectivity” of research (SE10).
The biology and culture questions appear most divisive.
With the exception of queries on race—where large majorities deny the utility of the concept and the reality of “racial”
differences (BC3, BC4, BC10)—the ﬁeld’s appraisal of evolutionary biology is contentious. Just under one-third of respondents
(32%) view as “misguided” evolutionary attempts to uncover
“universal” features of human cultures. Yet 57% of respondents
attest to the “important contribution” that evolutionary perspectives make in explaining “key aspects” of such cultures. We
see comparable divisions when we turn to more speculative
questions regarding humans’ evolutionary heritage. Anthropologists are closely split over the plausibility of whether human prehistory was more peaceful than industrial society,
whether tribal conﬂict was a principal selective force in human
nature, and whether men have evolved a desire for more sexual
variety than women (BC5, BC6, BC8).
The legacies of Mead and Chagnon suggest a mixed bag.7
Two-thirds of respondents agree that Mead “romanticizes the
sexual freedom of Samoan adolescents,” while just under
one-half afﬁrm that she was “ideologically motivated” to do so.
A modest 28% endorse Derek Freeman’s charge that Mead was
duped by a number of her Samoan informants, while only
36% ﬁnd Freeman’s 1983 critique “unconvincing.” Regarding
Chagnon, and given his notoriety, it is hardly surprising
that anthropologists’ responses would prove sharply polarized. Indeed, the ﬁeld is closely divided over whether Chagnon
“harmed the Yanomami by acting unethically in his ﬁeldwork” and whether his provocative research on unokai reproductive success is “credible” (CL5, CL7). While close to half
of the ﬁeld (48%) ﬁnds his work “ideologically motivated,” almost as many respondents (45%) view Patrick Tierney’s ruinous
allegations in Darkness in El Dorado as “thoroughly discredited.”
We see, hence, a ﬁeld divided. To probe more deeply the
variegated results, we turn to three areas where signiﬁcant
7. We will not address the David Stoll/Rigoberta Menchú controversy
here due to the paucity of meaningful survey responses. (Although we
return to it in our discussion below.) Despite the fervor of the controversy in the late nineties, relatively few anthropologists appear conversant with it today and fewer yet take decided positions. To wit: 55% of
anthropologists reveal “no knowledge” of the controversy, and among
the others, fewer than one in ﬁve (on average) mark agreement or disagreement with any of the corresponding survey items.
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Table 2. Survey items
Survey item

Survey item description

Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7
SE8

SE9
SE10
Moral relativism and
advocacy (MR):
MR1
MR2

I support the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
No matter how “brutal” some cultural practices may appear (e.g., female genital mutilation, sati, etc.), we should
not condemn such practices as anthropologists from Western societies.
I personally ﬁnd female genital mutilation (type III—inﬁbulation) to be a brutal and unethical procedure regardless
of how it is viewed in the places where it is practiced.
I consider myself to be a moral relativist.
Anthropologists have an ethical responsibility within their research to stand in solidarity with the marginalized
groups they study.
As an academic organization, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) should not be involved
in proposing any politically oriented resolutions, academic boycotts, et cetera.

MR3
MR4
MR5
MR6
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1
BC2
BC3
BC4
BC5
BC6
BC7

BC8
BC9
BC10
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1
CL2
CL3
CL4
CL5
CL6
CL7
CL8
CL9

CL10
CL11
CL12

On balance, advances in scientiﬁc knowledge over the years have improved human well-being.
Society would be better off if the consensus views of scientists were better heeded in government and public policy.
On the whole, traditional indigenous knowledges regarding medicine or cosmology are no less “true” than modern
scientiﬁc explanations.
Science is just one way of knowing, no more valid or accurate than other approaches to knowledge.
At their best, scientiﬁc theories provide truthful representations of reality beyond merely instrumentally
useful predictions.
Anthropologists’ depictions of indigenous cultures reﬂect more their own power and interests as knowledge
producers than “true” descriptions of the reality of those cultures.
Anthropology is undermined today by antiscientiﬁc attitudes in the discipline.
The American Anthropological Association’s (AAA) 2010 proposal to remove references to “science” in its
long-term plan—afﬁrming that the purpose of the association is to advance “public understanding of
humankind”—was a worthy effort.
Postmodern theories have made an important contribution to anthropology.
Advocacy and ﬁeldwork should be kept as separate as possible to help protect the objectivity of the research.

Attempts to use evolutionary biology to explain “universal” features of human cultures are misguided.
Evolutionary biological perspectives make a signiﬁcant contribution to explaining key aspects of human cultures.
The social construct of “race” has no corresponding biological reality.
Attempts to discover a genetic component to behavioral differences between “racial” groups are bound to fail.
Whatever the variability, foraging societies in prehistory were on the whole more peaceful than later agricultural
or industrial societies (i.e. they experienced less violence and homicide on average).
Tribal conﬂict was a principal selective force that shaped human nature.
People’s taste for foods containing fat and sugar is prewired into our brains by evolution. Such high-energy
foods conferred a ﬁtness advantage in humans’ ancestral environment—hence people evolved an impulse
to gorge on such foods.
Men have a biologically evolved desire for more sexual variety than women.
Multiple sexual partners among women and men was common in foraging societies in prehistory, where paternity
was not a major concern.
The comparatively high IQ scores and disproportionate scientiﬁc contributions of Ashkenazi Jews (e.g., Nobel and
Fields Medal Prizes, etc.) reﬂect in part a genetic component of their intelligence.
In Coming of Age in Samoa, Margaret Mead romanticizes the sexual freedom of Samoan adolescents.
Mead’s description of Samoan sexual norms was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by her being duped by some
of her Samoan informants.
Derek Freeman’s criticism of Mead in Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth is unconvincing.
Mead was ideologically motivated to present a permissive portrait of sexual norms in Samoa.
Napoleon Chagnon harmed the Yanomami by acting unethically in his ﬁeldwork.
Chagnon was ideologically motivated to present a bellicose view of human nature in his research.
Chagnon’s research documenting a link between male violence and reproductive success among the
Yanomami is credible.
The major claims in Patrick Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado have been thoroughly discredited.
David Stoll’s Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans accurately documents a number of
misrepresentations by Menchú about her life, such as her educational background and the nature
of her family’s land dispute.
Stoll’s search for factual misrepresentations in Menchú’s story was reprehensible given Menchú’s background
in the Guatemalan civil war (including the army’s murder of members of her family).
Stoll’s research was carried out poorly.
Stoll was politically motivated to discredit Menchú and Guatemala’s guerilla movement.
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Table 3. Distribution of survey responses
Survey item
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7
SE8
SE9
SE10
Moral relativism and advocacy (MR):
MR1
MR2
MR3
MR4
MR5
MR6
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1
BC2
BC3
BC4
BC5b
BC6b
BC7b
BC8b
BC9b
BC10b
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1
CL2
CL3
CL4
CL5
CL6
CL7
CL8
CL9
CL10
CL11
CL12

Question description

n

Percent agreea

Percent disagreea

Scientiﬁc advances have improved well-being
Society better off if scientists heeded on policy
Traditional indigenous knowledges no less “true”
Science is just one way of knowing
Best theories represent reality truthfully
Depictions reﬂect power more than “truth”
Field is undermined by antiscientiﬁc attitudes
AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy effort
Postmodern theories made important contribution
Advocacy and ﬁeldwork kept separate for objectivity

289
288
286
289
282
281
288
288
288
292

89
86
31
22
67
17
54
13
60
39

2
3
41
61
9
47
28
65
23
43

Support UN Declaration of Human Rights
“Brutal” cultural practices should not be condemned
Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical
I consider myself to be a moral relativist
Should stand in solidarity with marginalized groups
AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc.

300
300
300
301
291
293

89
18
72
29
54
33

1
58
9
38
17
52

Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided
Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute
Social construct of “race” has no biological reality
No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences
Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful
Tribal conﬂict was a principal selective force
Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution
Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety
Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common
Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component

283
281
281
280
280
278
276
274
268
273

32
57
76
78
37
36
65
31
41
14

45
23
15
8
34
33
17
38
20
57

Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans
Mead duped by Samoan informants
Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing
Mead ideologically motivated
Chagnon harmed the Yanomami
Chagnon ideologically motivated
Chagnon’s research credible
Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited
Stoll accurately documents Menchú
Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible
Stoll’s research was carried out poorly
Stoll politically motivated

260
261
261
264
263
263
262
251
218
217
211
215

66
28
36
49
41
48
38
45
26
12
8
18

9
25
19
10
34
24
31
13
4
18
5
5

Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b
BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
a

patterns emerged in the data: anthropologists’ subﬁeld specialty, gender, and political identity.

Disciplinary Divisions
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report responses by anthropological specialty,
gender, and political orientation. These descriptive tables are
helpful in providing baselines with regard to where the various
groupings stand on the survey items. Reading them in tandem
with our regression models in table 7 nicely captures both the
meaning and the statistical signiﬁcance of the salient patterns.
Regarding subﬁeld, the ﬁrst anthropological camp appears
to be biological anthropologists, who vary signiﬁcantly from

their colleagues on 16 survey items across all four thematic
categories (see table 7).8 Biological anthropologists are much
less likely to reveal any hint of epistemological relativism
than their colleagues. They are signiﬁcantly less likely to view
science as just “another way of knowing” (SE4) or to value the
contributions of postmodern theories (SE9). They contrast
sharply with their sociocultural colleagues by afﬁrming that
research “objectivity” should be protected by strict separation
of advocacy and ﬁeldwork (SE10), and they are signiﬁcantly
8. Note that we use linguistic anthropologists as the reference group
in the subﬁeld models. This makes sense, as they make up the smallest
branch of the discipline, reﬂected proportionally in our sample.
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Table 4. Distribution of survey responses by anthropological specialty
Survey item

Archaeology
(% agree/disagree)a

Biological
(% agree/disagree)a

Cultural
(% agree/disagree)a

Scientiﬁc advances have improved well-being
Society better off if scientists heeded on policy
Traditional indigenous knowledges no less “true”
Science is just one way of knowing
Best theories represent reality truthfully
Depictions reﬂect power more than “truth”
Field is undermined by antiscientiﬁc attitudes
AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy
effort
Postmodern theories made important contribution
Advocacy and ﬁeldwork kept separate for objectivity

93/2
87/3
32/37
22/63
68/9
20/43
60/23
7/76

93/0
90/4
20/63
8/85
78/9
19/36
85/4
3/89

85/3
85/3
37/31
29/46
60/8
14/56
31/47
20/49

63/23
51/38

39/41
54/29

69/12
21/55

Support UN Declaration of Human Rights
“Brutal” cultural practices should not be
condemned
Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical
I consider myself to be a moral relativist.
Should stand in solidarity with marginalized
groups
AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc.
Biology and culture
Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided
Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute
Social construct of “race” has no biological reality
No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences
Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful
Tribal conﬂict was a principal selective force
Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution
Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety
Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common
Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component

94/1
15/57

84/1
24/63

88/1
16/56

84/2
33/33
51/19

80/4
32/35
49/18

56/16
21/44
60/13

34/49

45/41

25/58

30/46
61/17
79/14
69/9
31/39
38/33
62/16
26/38
36/11
14/57

16/67
77/8
61/28
73/14
30/44
44/30
83/7
45/28
35/37
21/51

44/31
41/38
81/9
87/1
48/23
30/39
58/22
24/45
48/18
9/64

Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans
Mead duped by Samoan informants
Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing
Mead ideologically motivated in Samoa
Chagnon harmed the Yanomami
Chagnon ideologically motivated
Chagnon’s research credible
Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited
Stoll accurately documents Menchú
Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible
Stoll’s research was carried out poorly
Stoll politically motivated

63/6
33/15
28/21
46/14
39/30
51/21
38/23
44/6
21/7
8/15
10/3
11/3

63/5
30/16
24/19
37/8
17/60
20/38
64/11
69/2
16/0
4/18
6/4
10/2

71/12
24/37
49/18
59/8
58/23
66/19
26/47
34/24
33/3
19/20
7/7
24/9

Question description

Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7
SE8
SE9
SE10
Moral relativism and
advocacy (MR):
MR1
MR2
MR3
MR4
MR5
MR6
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1
BC2
BC3
BC4
BC5b
BC6b
BC7b
BC8b
BC9b
BC10b
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1
CL2
CL3
CL4
CL5
CL6
CL7
CL8
CL9
CL10
CL11
CL12

Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b
BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
a

more likely to believe that the AAA should not propose any
politically oriented resolutions or boycotts (MR6).
Unsurprisingly, biological anthropologists are signiﬁcantly
more likely to endorse evolutionary approaches to human cultures. Yet they differ signiﬁcantly on the more speculative questions as well. They are much more receptive to evolutionary explanations of people’s “prewired” taste for fats and sweets (BC7),

while expressing greater skepticism of the view that paternity was
no major concern in polyamorous prehistoric societies (BC9).
Note that although there is strong consensus in the ﬁeld denying
the utility of the construct of “race,” biological anthropologists
are less likely to deny any corresponding biological reality to the
construct (BC4). Moreover, although the difference does not
reach statistical signiﬁcance when controlling for other factors, a
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Table 5. Distribution of survey responses by gender
Survey item
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7
SE8
SE9
SE10
Moral relativism and advocacy (MR):
MR1
MR2
MR3
MR4
MR5
MR6
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1
BC2
BC3
BC4
BC5b
BC6b
BC7b
BC8b
BC9b
BC10b
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1
CL2
CL3
CL4
CL5
CL6
CL7
CL8
CL9
CL10
CL11
CL12

Question description

Women
(% agree/disagree)a

Men
(% agree/disagree)a

Science and epistemology
Scientiﬁc advances have improved well-being
Society better off if scientists heeded on policy
Traditional indigenous knowledges no less “true”
Science is just one way of knowing
Best theories represent reality truthfully
Depictions reﬂect power more than “truth”
Field is undermined by antiscientiﬁc attitudes
AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy effort
Postmodern theories made important contribution
Advocacy and ﬁeldwork kept separate for objectivity

82/1
83/1
49/23
36/42
60/9
28/35
45/33
18/62
67/18
26/56

92/2
89/2
19/55
12/73
71/9
11/55
61/23
9/68
55/27
49/34

Support UN Declaration of Human Rights
“Brutal” cultural practices should not be condemned
Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical
I consider myself to be a moral relativist
Should stand in solidarity with marginalized groups
AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc.

88/1
20/56
69/12
30/38
61/12
22/62

89/2
17/60
74/7
27/38
50/20
42/43

Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided
Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute
Social construct of “race” has no biological reality
No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences
Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful
Tribal conﬂict was a principal selective force
Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution
Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety
Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common
Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component

42/32
45/29
73/18
80/8
43/31
24/41
56/26
23/51
45/20
10/62

25/52
65/18
78/13
75/8
32/35
44/28
72/10
37/29
38/20
17/53

Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans
Mead duped by Samoan informants
Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing
Mead ideologically motivated
Chagnon harmed the Yanomami
Chagnon ideologically motivated
Chagnon’s research credible
Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited
Stoll accurately documents Menchú
Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible
Stoll’s research was carried out poorly
Stoll politically motivated

59/8
20/30
36/17
41/14
51/21
59/14
25/36
41/13
29/3
16/17
11/2
20/5

71/8
34/22
36/21
54/8
34/43
39/31
47/28
49/13
24/4
9/17
6/7
16/6

Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b
BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
a

larger minority of biological anthropologists (21% vs. 14% for
the full sample) ﬁnds plausible the incendiary hypothesis by
Cochran et al. (2006) of a genetic component to Ashkenazi Jewish
intelligence (BC10).
Biological anthropologists’ appraisals of Napoleon Chagnon
represent a dramatic rift in the ﬁeld. In fact, they differ signiﬁcantly from their colleagues on each item. Only 17% (versus
58% of cultural anthropologists) believe that Chagnon harmed
the Yanomami by acting unethically in his ﬁeldwork, and only
20% see his research as ideologically motivated. In contrast to
their archaeological and cultural colleagues, solid majorities ﬁnd

Chagnon’s sociobiological research credible (64%) and dismiss
the major claims in Tierney’s book (69%).
We suspect that the ﬁndings here would hardly surprise anthropologists. Might we attribute them simply to differences in
subdisciplinary training and practice? At home with the norms
of the natural sciences (and steeped in evolutionary theory), one
would expect biological anthropologists to be less congenial to
epistemological intricacies and more prone to support their sociobiological brethren. We do indeed contend in our discussion
that subﬁeld socialization plays a role in cultivating anthropologists’ orientations to these controversial issues. Yet the
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Table 6. Distribution of survey responses by political orientation
Survey item

Liberals
Moderates
Radicals
(% agree/disagree)a (% agree/disagree)a (% agree/disagree)a

Question description

Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7
SE8
SE9
SE10
Moral relativism and
advocacy (MR):
MR1
MR2
MR3
MR4
MR5
MR6
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1
BC2
BC3
BC4
BC5b
BC6b
BC7b
BC8b
BC9b
BC10b
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1
CL2
CL3
CL4
CL5
CL6
CL7
CL8
CL9
CL10
CL11
CL12

Scientiﬁc advances have improved well-being
Society better off if scientists heeded on policy
Traditional indigenous knowledges no less true
Science is just one way of knowing
Best theories represent reality truthfully
Depictions reﬂect power more than “truth”
Field is undermined by antiscientiﬁc attitudes
AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy effort
Postmodern theories made important contribution
Advocacy and ﬁeldwork kept separate for objectivity

83/3
86/0
42/17
29/37
53/12
26/29
22/56
31/34
70/6
6/69

89/1
89/2
30/45
22/64
68/10
18/50
59/25
10/70
60/25
41/43

97/0
79/9
29/44
18/64
84/0
9/39
65/12
6/76
55/24
59/24

Support UN Declaration of Human Rights
“Brutal” cultural practices should not be
condemned
Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical
I consider myself to be a moral relativist
Should stand in solidarity with marginalized groups
AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc.

92/0
14/42

91/0
17/61

83/6
17/27

62/14
30/38
78/6
6/83

74/9
31/37
54/16
36/50

65/3
17/33
32/32
41/29

Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided
Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute
Social construct of “race” has no biological reality
No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences
Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful
Tribal conﬂict was a principal selective force
Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution
Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety
Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common
Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component

51/23
31/43
85/9
91/0
56/15
18/52
47/35
9/59
55/6
6/68

31/54
62/21
75/16
78/10
36/35
38/33
72/14
33/36
43/21
14/61

24/41
55/12
70/15
63/9
29/50
44/28
52/15
36/36
29/23
19/39

Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans
Mead duped by Samoan informants
Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing
Mead ideologically motivated in Samoa
Napolean Chagnon harmed the Yanomami
Chagnon ideologically motivated
Chagnon’s research credible
Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited
Stoll accurately documents Menchú
Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible
Stoll’s research was carried out poorly
Stoll politically motivated

59/8
12/35
47/12
44/12
74/9
82/0
15/64
19/22
24/6
30/12
10/3
34/0

65/10
29/25
36/17
49/11
38/38
45/27
39/28
48/12
26/4
10/18
10/5
15/7

72/6
38/22
34/31
50/3
31/41
28/31
55/15
67/0
23/0
0/26
0/5
10/5

Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b
BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
a

suspicion that more is at play is conﬁrmed by attention to gender
and political identity. Our ﬁndings regarding both gender and
politics surpass expectations and bolster our call for a socialpsychology of knowledge production in the sciences.
Turning ﬁrst to gender, we see that females diverge signiﬁcantly from males on 21 of the 38 items (see table 6). They differ
on every item speciﬁc to epistemology, evincing much greater
receptiveness to relativism (e.g., about half afﬁrm that indige-

nous “knowledges” regarding medicine and cosmology are no
less “true” than modern scientiﬁc explanations), and they show
much less inclination to separate advocacy and ﬁeldwork for
the sake of objectivity (26% vs. 49% of males). Although analogous to men on questions of advocacy and moral relativism
(with the exception of the AAA’s political activities), women
diverge notably in their appraisals of evolutionary biology and
Chagnon’s legacy. Women are signiﬁcantly less inclined to value
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Table 7. Ordinary least squares regression results
Unstandardized coefﬁcientsa,b
Subﬁeld
Survey item
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7
SE8
SE9
SE10
Moral relativism and advocacy (MR):
MR1
MR2
MR3
MR4
MR5
MR6
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1
BC2
BC3
BC4
BC5
BC6
BC7
BC8
BC9
BC10
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1
CL2
CL3
CL4
CL5
CL6
CL7
CL8
CL9
CL10
CL11
CL12

Gender

Political orientation

Culture

Female

Radical

Liberal

Moderate

R2

n

.084
.060
.328
.030
2.074
2.027
2.303
2.387
.007
2.090

2.095
.011
.852**
.836**
2.212*
.371**
2.398**
.238*
.296*
2.539**

2.007
.515*
.401
.526
2.017
.627*
2.492
.723*
.748*
21.408**

.308
.645**
.033
.181
.158
.180
.074
2.026
.535*
2.695*

.351
.318
.248
.295
.467
.254
.130
2.016
.554
2.267

.087
.058
.200
.233
.056
.094
.241
.223
.135
.209

283
282
280
283
276
275
282
282
282
286

.159
.058
.153
2.214
2.021
.556*

.175
2.002
2.292
2.573**
.277
.105

.019
.118
2.118
.015
.164
2.483**

.596**
2.155
.149
.555*
.845**
21.174**

.546**
2.413
.202
.434
.385
2.279

.199
2.336
.175
.368
2.023
2.040

.069
.014
.063
.046
.085
.145

294
294
294
295
284
288

2.267
.103
2.390
2.332
2.209
2.057
.210
2.126
2.363
2.089

2.841**
.591*
2.814**
2.286
2.353
.130
.661**
.327
2.620**
.008

.162
2.365
2.226
.078
.120
2.215
.122
2.133
2.299
2.396

.542**
2.452**
2.178
.138
.111
2.455**
2.417**
2.518**
.104
2.209*

.629*
2.460
.441
.583*
.835*
2.510
2.455
2.940**
.830**
21.038**

.144
2.011
.295
.192
.325
2.111
.024
2.307
.614*
2.912**

.294
2.199
2.054
2.140
2.009
2.203
2.452
2.366
.495
2.530

.163
.162
.070
.087
.080
.080
.128
.135
.065
.097

278
276
276
275
275
273
270
269
263
268

2.076
.394*
2.346
2.004
2.296
.096
.429
.247
2.176
.024
.042
2.294*

.006
.378
2.316
.042
2.998**
2.493*
.970**
.822**
2.172
2.043
2.017
2.218

.008
.060
.040
.250
.056
.322
.053
.047
2.026
.120
2.062
2.274*

2.136
2.200*
2.037
2.195*
.565**
.431**
2.340**
2.221*
.013
.070
.081
.053

2.155
2.724**
.967**
2.326
.960**
1.165**
21.219**
2.049
2.130
.389
.128
.258

2.161
2.478*
.789**
2.180
.347
.411
2.533*
.322
2.026
.083
.103
2.033

2.077
2.360
.636*
2.191
.398
.272
2.217
.707*
2.002
2.095
2.027
2.027

.014
.078
.071
.044
.214
.207
.238
.175
.019
.059
.029
.045

255
256
256
259
258
258
257
247
214
213
207
211

Archaeology

Biology

.254
.104
.252
2.264
2.075
.318
.400
2.889**
2.293
.441

.416*
.192
2.390
2.960**
.287
.310
1.095**
21.272**
2.968**
.676**

.331*
.043
.208
2.210
.059
.297

a

Intercept terms are not shown.
Signiﬁcance tests are one-tailed.
** P ! .01.
* P ! .05.

b

evolutionary biological perspectives and much less receptive to
accounts of a conﬂictual human nature or alleged male propensity for sexual variety. Finally, majorities of women afﬁrm
that Chagnon was ideologically motivated in his research (59%)
and that he unethically harmed the Yanomami (51%).
Plainly the ﬁeld appears split into gendered groupings as well,
yet it turns out that political identity is comparably signiﬁcant.
As indicated in table 1, anthropologists are overwhelmingly
liberal, with radicals and moderates collectively making up only

25% of our sample. Conservatives and libertarians constitute a
mere 2% of respondents—conﬁrming Starn’s (2015) observation
that one is more likely to encounter “an anteater in a shopping
mall” than “a Republican anthropologist” (14).9 Reviewing table 6,
we see that radicals differ signiﬁcantly from their conservative
colleagues on 20 survey items (while liberals diverge on nine
9. It is due to their sparse representation that we combine conservatives
and libertarians as the reference group in the political orientation models.
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and moderates on only two). Similar to females, radicals show
more sympathy for epistemological relativism, reporting stronger support for postmodern theories, greater receptiveness to
removing “science” from the AAA’s long-range plan, and virtually no interest in separating advocacy and ﬁeldwork to protect objectivity. Radicals are signiﬁcantly more likely to call for
solidarity with the marginalized groups that they study, and they
overwhelmingly reject the view that the AAA should not engage
in politically oriented activities.
With regard to biology, radicals again echo women in being
signiﬁcantly more likely to reject evolutionary explanations of
“universal” features of human cultures (indeed, a slight majority
ﬁnds such attempts “misguided”). In pronounced contrast to
their colleagues, radicals decidedly reject the evolutionary psychological chestnut of a male instinct for sexual variety (59%),
with a majority (55%) endorsing the plausibility of the view—
popularized by Ryan and Jethá (2010)—that polyamory characterized prehistoric societies with little concern for paternity.
Finally, radicals were signiﬁcantly more likely than their colleagues to reject the plausibility of a genetic component to
Ashkenazi intelligence.
Regarding the controversies, both radicals (and to a lesser
extent, liberals) were signiﬁcantly more inclined to discard
Freeman’s (1983) attacks on Mead and deny his allegation that
she was duped by her Samoan informants. As to Chagnon,
radicals overwhelmingly afﬁrm (82%) that he was ideologically
motivated to present a “bellicose” human nature (with zero
percent disagreement). Seventy-four percent believe that he
unethically harmed the Yanomami, and only 15% ﬁnd credible
his sociobiological interpretation of the unokai. Note that each
of these items is statistically signiﬁcant, vividly illustrating the
pattern of differences among subﬁeld, gender, and political
groupings.
Space does not permit us to comment on all items. But we
encourage readers to examine the results closely and note that
even when items do not reach statistical signiﬁcance, again and
again we see a consistent direction of responses by gender and
political orientation. To provide an explanation of these provocative ﬁndings, we will venture cautiously into the thorny
terrain of political psychology.

Discussion
Anthropology’s Emotive Communities: A Social
Intuitionist Interpretation
In a recent commentary, Glynn Custred (2016) applauds
Chagnon’s work while condemning what he sees as a radical
“faction” within anthropology, one that aims to transform the
ﬁeld into a “politically correct university outpost.” Revitalizing
the “noble savage” myth, Custred decries, activists hope “to
sweep down the memory hole” research such as Chagnon’s that
reveals a deep history of human warfare. Regrettably, rather
than being open to “biological links” to human behavior,
“politicized anthropology” views any such link as “a heresy
that must be extirpated.”
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In sharp contrast, Ryan and Jethá (2010) condemn Chagnon
for “swashbuckling into Yanomami lands,” “inﬂaming” violence wherever he turns, and “seducing” readers with “tales of
derring-do among the vicious and violent ‘savages’” (223–227).
Our “bullshit detectors go off,” they declare—reproaching both
Chagnon and Steven Pinker (2011)—when scholars point to
“violent chimps and a few cherry-picked horticultural societies”
as evidence of “ancient tendencies toward warfare” (Ryan and
Jethá 2010:223–227)
Our ﬁndings in this study suggest that readers’ appraisals
of the above remarks likely reﬂect more than their knowledge
of human prehistory. Indeed, we suspect that for some their
attraction or aversion to Custred’s or Ryan and Jethá’s words
implicate their professional and personal identities and underlying emotional sensibilities. Consider our respondents’10 opposing views regarding the credibility of Chagnon’s work on
the reproductive success of Yanomami “killers”:
• Studies by many anthropologists have shown that his premises and use of statistics were very ﬂawed.
• This is credible as this has been found in other human societies so has been replicated.
• This is one of the silliest arguments in anthropology. The
simple demographic fact is that “if you are killed whether by
male or female violence you do not contribute to the ongoing reproductive success of any group. End of argument”
(respondent’s quotes).
• Ridiculous question—missing the point—get with the current concerns of indigenous peoples.
We received many such reactions pro et contra to most of
our survey items. This may be expected when examining
sensitive questions that have long vexed a ﬁeld. Yet our aim
here is not so much to take sides in the controversies as to map
what we see as their underlying emotive dynamics. As we
stress, issues that push social scientists’ emotional buttons are
most likely to undermine empirical consensus. Even the facts
surrounding the 2010 AAA mission ﬂap prove contentious.
Recall that we ask anthropologists whether the AAA’s proposal
to remove reference to “science” from its long-range plan was a
“worthy effort” (SE8). The event, however, hardly spurs consensus regarding its basic details, much less its implications for
the discipline:
• The most important issue in anthropology today is the 2010
revision of the AAA representation of anthropology. It removed science and evolution from its representation of the
discipline.
• It was horrible. It wounded us to such an extent that we are
still recuperating from it. What a mistake it was.
• It was and apparently is widely misunderstood. It was not a
major statement on the role of science but an attempt by
10. We were delighted to receive more than 1,000 remarks by anthropologists in the comment boxes across the 38 survey items.
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some to overly nuance the balance between what some
think of science (as pure) and others as more relative.
• This was a random clerical error that signaled nothing about
the AAA’s actual position.
• It was an oversight, a slip.
The “most important” issue in anthropology? A ﬁeld still
“recuperating?” A “misunderstood” attempt for “nuance?” A
“clerical error?”
Such disparate interpretations show how even a single
event—should it tap the nerve of an academic community—
may elicit all manner of (re)constructions. Indeed, we suspect
that constructions of “science” in this quarrel serve as a proxy
for anthropologists’ respective group identities and moral
emotions. To sketch what we see as the emotive dynamics of
anthropology’s ongoing divisions, we draw tentatively from
current research in political psychology. We ﬁnd Jonathan
Haidt and colleagues’ work on “social intuitionism,” elaborated in “moral foundations theory” (MFT), to be especially
helpful in this regard (Haidt 2001, 2012; Haidt and Graham
2006; Haidt and Joseph 2004, 2007).
The literature on moral foundations is vast and growing
and is beyond our space here to unpack in detail (see Graham
et al. 2011 for an overview). As far as we know, however, our
studies are distinctive in applying MFT to the contours of social
scientiﬁc debates (Horowitz and Hughes 2017; Yaworsky,
Horowitz, and Kickham 2015). Our basic argument is that
scholars who share the same underlying moral emotions (or
intuitions) tend to gravitate (consciously or otherwise) toward
interpretive and emotive communities. Such communities
often draw from their disciplinary repertoires the same recipe
of methods and tools and interpret evidence in kindred ways.
This occasions in-group/out-group dynamics both within
their ﬁelds and without. This is not to deny, of course, the
centrality of the empirical in adjudicating social scientiﬁc
debates. Yet when it comes to morally charged matters, such as
the controversies raised in our survey, contrasting intergroup
intuitions is more likely to be activated.
As an intuitive model of moral reasoning, MFT stresses that
people make judgments based on unconscious “ﬂashes of approval or disapproval” toward morally charged affairs (Haidt
and Joseph 2004:56). Conscious deliberation comes afterward,
often serving to rationalize people’s automatic (gut) reactions.
Such automatic responses depend on people’s particular mix
of ﬁve moral foundations—speciﬁcally, their underlying intuitions regarding care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and sanctity.11
Haidt and colleagues ﬁnd that people on the left-liberal end of
the political spectrum have a narrower moral template than
11. MFT holds that these intuitions have deep evolutionary roots,
meeting adaptive challenges in prehistory (e.g., reacting to human suffering with care helps ensure kin survival; feeling group loyalty and
punishing traitors helps ensure advantage in the context of intergroup
competition for resources; etc.) See Haidt and Graham (2006) for discussion of their evolutionary argument.
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those on the right. Speciﬁcally, the twin foundations of care and
fairness saturate the political morality of the left. The template
of the political right, however, is broader and includes all ﬁve
intuitions.12 Hence care and fairness concerns are not the only
triggers on the right. Right-leaning people tend much more than
those on the left to respect authority, value group loyalty, and
afﬁrm purity with regard to conventional moral norms. While
the left is spring-loaded to challenge authority on behalf of the
vulnerable, the right honors hierarchical relationships and feels
more afﬁnity to equity and tough-love sensibilities than the
egalitarian protectiveness of the left.
MFT views moral intuitions as inherited features of the
brain that are both innate and modular, although revised by
experience. The theory dovetails with a plethora of experimental and psychological literature conﬁrming the biological
roots of personality and consequent political orientation (e.g.,
Block and Block 2006; Hibbing, Alford, and Smith 2013; Jost
2009; Mooney 2012, 2014). As Mooney (2014) puts it, referring to a wave of new scientiﬁc evidence, “Long before they
become members of different parties, liberals and conservatives
appear to start out as different people.” Yet neither personality
nor politics are determined narrowly by the genes. People rather
are born “prewired” with certain characterological dispositions
that Haidt (drawing on Marcus 2004) calls a “ﬁrst draft.” Life
experiences in interaction with the genes rewrite future drafts in
ways that enable innateness to coexist with wide developmental
malleability (Haidt and Joseph 2007).
Engaging the complexities of debate on the biocultural
underpinnings of personality and politics would bring us far
aﬁeld. Yet we have in mind the following speculative scenario
with regard to aspiring anthropologists. Their liberal-minded sensibilities no doubt nudged them toward careers in academia—
after all, it is widely observed that liberals far outnumber conservatives in university positions (Gross 2013). This is dramatically
so in cultural anthropology, where the ratio reportedly stands
at about 30∶1 (Gross and Simmons 2007). Once ensconced
in their graduate school subﬁelds, they receive training in
the corresponding frameworks, conceptual tools, and practices
required to obtain their degrees. Such practices often nurture
disciplinary identity and a privileging of one’s academic turf,
especially in light of the investment expended to master its
techniques. Budding anthropologists are no doubt socialized
beyond formal techniques, however, to underlying scientiﬁc,
epistemological, and ethical assumptions. Indeed, we suspect
that the breadth of subdisciplinary socialization plays a role in
the marked contrast in responses we discovered between biological anthropologists and their (especially sociocultural)
colleagues.
Yet people are not merely vessels of their professional enculturation. Carrying different mixes of moral intuitions and
12. On their web page, https://www.yourmorals.org/, Haidt and colleagues suggest a candidate for a sixth moral foundation as well: “liberty,”
but this intuition has not been as thoroughly developed or consistently
applied.
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experiences with them (and consequently varied political identities), we would expect—if MFT is correct regarding the role
of emotions in people’s judgments—that liberals and conservatives independent of subﬁeld would differ in their interpretations of morally charged evidence. Plainly, this is precisely
what we have discovered in our survey. Although we note above
that there is scarcely a conservative among anthropology’s ranks,
we do see that radicals (and to a lesser extent, liberals) differ
signiﬁcantly from their colleagues on questions of epistemology, advocacy, and the merits of evolutionary explanations.
Women follow suit in this regard. We should stress as well that
in contrast to radicals, liberals, and women, moderates diverge
signiﬁcantly from their outlying conservative colleagues in
only two of the 38 survey items. This pattern suggests that
moral intuitions may indeed play a role in the ﬁeld’s disparate
appraisals of controversial evidence.
Given a ﬁeld predominated by left-liberal sensibilities, how
might intuitionism help explain why political identity and
gender are such reliable predictors of respondents’ varying
standpoints? The question of advocacy presents perhaps the
least difﬁculty. For MFT, the left’s acute sensitivity to care and
fairness suggests that actions or policies perceived to harm or
cheat the vulnerable are especially likely to trigger their moral
emotions. It is not surprising, hence, that left-wing scholars
who come together in emotive communities would reproduce
a discourse of moral responsibility toward subaltern groups.
This is only intensiﬁed in cultural anthropology, where the
ramiﬁcations of colonialism loom so large in the subject matter.
From this vantage point, we would anticipate much sympathy
for Scheper-Hughes’s call to her colleagues to stand in solidarity with the marginalized groups they study (D’Andrade 1995;
Scheper-Hughes 1995). (Indeed, 78% of radicals in our survey
concur with the charge vs. 32% of moderates; table 5, MR5.) For
Scheper-Hughes, the legacies of colonialism—and the brutal
conditions that normalize, for example, maternal complacency
toward infant death—render the sacred cow of political disengagement an utter abdication of ethical responsibility.
Of course the conventional critique of such engagement,
classically formulated by Weber (2009 [1917]), is that value
commitments distort the pursuit of truth: “When the man [sic]
of science introduces his personal value judgement, a full understanding of the facts ceases.”13 In his debate with ScheperHughes, D’Andrade (1995:408) echoes Weber by arguing that
“moral” and “objective” models cannot be effectively wed in
science. “It’s nice to believe one can have both,” he notes, “but
the evidence is strong that one cannot” (408).
D’Andrade poses a stark choice: either we pursue objective
models of the world or we embrace moral models at the expense of such objectivity. Yet radical scholars have long challenged this premise. Might we be, as Engels wrote long ago,
13. Weber’s position is actually a bit more subtle, unsurprisingly, in that
he argues that chosen scientiﬁc questions themselves have moral “presuppositions,” such as their worthiness of being known. Yet he plainly endorses a dispassionate orientation to research and teaching in practice.
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utopian and scientiﬁc? Many of our respondents believe so—
one noting what she sees as a “false polarity” between advocacy
and objectivity, another opining: “I don’t see that they need to
be separate,” and so on. MFT, however, aligns closely with
Weber/D’Andrade. Not only are people typically unaware of
the moral intuitions coloring their judgments but also their
emotive communities tend to reinforce their biases in groupish
ways. “Morality binds and blinds,” Haidt (2012:218) writes, in
what he views as a foundational principle of moral psychology.
For Haidt (2012), the blind spots of left academics can be seen
most clearly in their construction of “sacralized victims” (345).
Once a group is construed as sacred—be they ethnic, religious,
or other minorities, transgendered people, and so forth—it becomes much less likely to assess their circumstances accurately.
That is, whatever the facts may be, the left is trigger-ready to
interpret them in ways that avert potential harm to perceived
victims. It is in this context that we might understand the relative embrace of epistemological relativism by female and radical anthropologists. Consider item SE3: “On the whole, traditional indigenous knowledges regarding medicine or cosmology
are no less ‘true’ than modern scientiﬁc explanations.” Virtually
half (49%) of the women in our sample agree with this, differing
signiﬁcantly from the rest of the ﬁeld. Forty-two percent of
radicals concur as well. In this case, knowledge of the disparate
treatment afforded to native peoples over the centuries may act
as powerful “primers,” nudging them into vocalizing support for
a proposition that places indigenous culture on equal footing
with Western society. Yet is it the case that indigenous understandings of medicine or cosmology are no less accurate than
modern scientiﬁc accounts? No progress has been made by
Western science in these arenas that has surpassed indigenous
knowledge? Although we are reluctant to take sides in this
study—we aim to understand ideology and not merely critique
it—this extraordinary claim seems uninterpretable without
the tools of intuitionist social psychology.
Females and radicals are signiﬁcantly more likely than their
colleagues to agree with item SE6 as well: “Anthropologists’
depictions of indigenous cultures reﬂect more their own power
and interests as knowledge producers than ‘true’ descriptions of
the reality of those cultures.” Notice the scare quotes and essential doubt regarding any scientiﬁc approximations of “truth”
in both of these survey items. Recall, however, that anthropologists (including women and radicals) overwhelmingly afﬁrm that scientiﬁc advances have improved human well-being
over the years (SE1) and that society would be better off by
heeding the consensus views of scientists in public policy (SE2).
Respondents again and again comment unprompted about
climate change in this regard, acknowledging that scientiﬁc
practice, despite ﬁts and starts, produces accurate knowledge
over time.
It would be easy to call out our anthropology colleagues for
contradictory views here. How can science make long-term
advances that beneﬁt society with knowledge claims regarding
medicine or cosmology as relative or timeless as indigenous
folklore? Perhaps sensing their epistemological ambivalence,
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respondents stress contextual considerations in endorsing
scientiﬁc consensus:
• Climate change today, yes; cigarette smoking in the 1950s,
no.
• Some policy areas are more ﬁrmly graspable via scientiﬁc
methods than others. Climate change: yes. Easing of income
inequality: not so much. Eradication of racial discrimination: probably not at all.
• Pharmaceutical company–sponsored randomized control
trials? When it comes to climate change yes, but tell a woman
that mammography actually does not produce the results
they imagine.
• Science is particularly good at some types of truthiness. But
there are other approaches to knowledge that are more valid
when it comes to science’s blind spots.
We fully concur that science is all too often distorted by
corporate and political forces that fund and harness it around
their interests. Yet we wonder if statements like these conﬂate
the method of science with its socially corrupting embeddedness in wider ﬁelds of societal power and interests. We agree
that coming to consensus on social scientiﬁc questions of inequality or racial discrimination is much more difﬁcult due to
broader power relations and entrenched ideological divisions
(the underpinnings of which we have only tentatively sketched
in this report). Yet to bend the stick so far as the respondent does
above—that science is good at “some types of truthiness” but
that there are other “more valid” approaches to knowledge—
strikes us as wholly unconvincing without identifying the epistemological grounds for consenting to such approaches.
The question of alternative epistemology may jog the reader’s
memory of our discussion of the Menchú/Stoll controversy
described above. Recall that Stoll was widely condemned for
uncovering misrepresentations in Menchú’s testimonio. The
reactions were surely understandable at the time. In the context
of a brutal civil war, where hundreds of thousands perished,
Menchú and her family suffered grievously but Stoll not so. It is
hardly surprising in this setting that the progressive community
would close ranks around Menchú—a “sacred” symbol of peasant resistance—and attempt to “purge” ideas that threatened to
sully her reputation. Indeed, Stoll’s attempt at an “authoritative”
account of Menchú’s life was all the more galling to progressive
sensibilities given his status as a privileged Western observer.14
In MFT terms, the suddenly in-vogue descriptions of testimonio as a collective enterprise of “multiple positionalities,” or
“ways of knowing,” may be seen as ad hoc rationalizations of the
ﬁctitious elements in Menchú’s story (recounted in BurgosDebray 1983). As part of the left-liberal camp ourselves, we
should stress that we sympathize deeply with the collective

14. Although we did not have enough respondents to gauge statistical
signiﬁcance, consistent with expectations we found that radical anthropologists were more likely to ﬁnd Stoll’s research “reprehensible.”
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anguish that likely spurred such rationalizations. We appreciate
as well the respondent who grants that Menchú’s exaggerations
were a “problem” but that they should be seen “as reﬂecting the
limits of reaching a public that had ignored the genocide against
Maya villages then going on in Guatemala.” We by no means
believe that there is a pat answer regarding how and when social
scientiﬁc or other knowledge should be divulged, should such
disclosures have predictably injurious consequences in dire
historical circumstances. Yet we ﬁnd it critical not to let our
piqued sensitivities “bind and blind” us, as Haidt would put it,
into abandoning the scientiﬁc pursuit of truth. “No matter how
sympathetic a ﬁgure is,” one respondent notes, “it is important
to report the facts, and not let sympathy lead researchers into
rhetorical poses that romanticize their subjects.”
Arguably the most famous critic of the romanticization of the
indigenous in recent years is Steven Pinker (2011, 2016). Pinker
assails the Rousseauian doctrine of the noble savage, highlighting
wide-ranging literature in evolutionary biology, anthropology,
and paleontology on the prehistoric roots of violence and war.
The claim has proved quite divisive in social science today (as has
Pinker himself) and unsurprisingly has polarized our survey
results. Once again we see females and radicals in our sample
standing apart from their colleagues. They are least receptive
to the claim that tribal conﬂict was “a principal selective force
in human nature” (BC6) and most receptive to the idea that
prehistoric foraging societies were sexually permissive (BC9) and
“more peaceful than later agricultural or industrial societies”
(BC5). As noted above, females and radicals are less inclined to
welcome evolutionary explanations of human cultures, with
many rejecting widely endorsed propositions in evolutionary
psychology. Indeed, a majority of radical anthropologists do
not ﬁnd plausible even the uncontroversial view that natural
selection shaped humans’ taste for foods with fat and sugar
(BC7). It is hardly surprising then that a mere 9% would ﬁnd
plausible the view of an evolved male impulse for greater sexual
variety than women (BC8).
We have reﬂected elsewhere on the likely emotive underpinnings of left academics’ resistance to evolutionary psychology (Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham 2014; see also Jonason
and Schmitt 2016). Sufﬁce to note that although claims regarding
evolved, adaptive roots of current human behaviors cannot be
tested experimentally—inviting their widespread dismissals by
detractors as “just-so” stories (e.g., Gould 1997; Kimmel 2004)—
from a moral foundations perspective, more is going on than
simply intellectual disagreement about the credibility of available evidence. It appears that acknowledging an instinctual
component of darker aspects of human nature (e.g., intergroup
violence, sexual possessiveness) runs headlong into the left’s
intergroup identities and underlying collective emotions. As
committed egalitarians, attuned deeply to the intuitions of care
and fairness, ideas that appear to them to naturalize hierarchy or
reward violence in any way trigger mechanical dismissal. The
comparatively frosty appraisals of Chagnon’s legacy by radicals
(and to a lesser extent, liberals) can certainly be interpreted in
this light.
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Although the gendered differences in responses to our
questions were signiﬁcant and widespread, to date, MFT has
little to say on gender. We ﬁnd this puzzling. A wide-ranging
study (Graham et al. 2011) ﬁnds that women reveal signiﬁcantly
greater sensitivity than men to care and harm concerns when
rendering moral judgments.15 Yet theorizing the reasons why
lags in MFT. Some cognitive scientists (Baron-Cohen 2009; see
also Christov-Moore et al. 2014) argue controversially that average differences by gender in the experience of empathy and
compassion are in part innate and have evolutionary biological
roots. This view need not contradict traditional social scientiﬁc
emphases on cultural factors and socialization, even among
sociobiologists. Hrdy (1999), for example, views female nurturing strategies, even those directed toward their own offspring,
as calculated, context dependent, and subject to the forces of
culture. Whatever its biological, cultural, or interactive roots, a
keener intuitive sensitivity to care and harm among women may
help explain the distinct gendered results in our survey.
Unsurprisingly, radicals were signiﬁcantly less likely to entertain the most delicate items in our survey bearing on the
potential reality of “race.” As discussed above, the ﬁeld overwhelmingly denies a biological reality to race (BC3) and believes
that “attempts to discover a genetic component to behavioral
differences between ‘racial’ groups are bound to fail” (BC4).
Anthropologists are deeply skeptical as well of a genetic component of the comparatively high IQ scores of Ashkenazi Jews
(BC10). We hardly wish to pull the tiger’s tail in our ﬁnal
thoughts, nor do we endorse the view of biological races.16 However, notwithstanding the complexity and sensitivity of these
issues, we wonder about the extent to which moral intuitions and
disciplinary identities may render off limits even measured inquiry into these matters.17 The “racialist” arguments made by
science writer Nicholas Wade (2015), for example, have struck a
deep nerve as evidenced by the joint letter by 143 academicians
rebuking his book (Coop et al. 2014). We do not have the space
to elaborate further on the matter. We should note, however,
that there is less consensus among anthropologists globally on

15. Graham et al.’s (2011) international database of 49,428 women
and 68,812 men found that women were signiﬁcantly more concerned
than men about harm, fairness, and purity, while men evinced slightly
higher concern for in-group loyalty and authority.
16. We concur with the anthropological consensus, going back most
prominently to Boas (1912), discarding the notion of races as ﬁxed or natural
categories. Clinal studies support this conclusion, as do most contemporary
anthropologists (see Wagner et al. 2016). Of course, scientists who favor the
concept often point to its utility in forensic analysis (Gill 2000). They also
highlight continental “clusters” of traits that for “racial realists” matter as
much as clines (Wade 2015).
17. The following are only a handful of the responses revealing
anthropologists’ widespread aversion to these questions: “As an Ashkenazi
Jew, I really hate this argument,” “This is a racist question,” and “It would
take pages to explain my objections to this question.” We should add that
there were a comparable number of respondents who suggested that the
research is not available or settled on the matter.
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the disutility of the race concept than there is in the United
States and Western Europe (see Štrkalj 2007).

Concluding Remarks
Some two decades after the science wars, we have aimed in this
study to take stock of the ﬁeld of anthropology. Although we
have been loath to take sides in the controversies discussed, we
hardly see ourselves on an enlightened perch above the fray of
collective dispute. In fact, a chief limitation of this kind of
study is that we do not carry out the hard work of engaging
these contentious issues empirically. Although we appear to
upbraid our fellow left-liberal colleagues for potential blind
spots, by no means do we view their respective positions on
these controversies as necessarily wrong. Indeed, we believe
that the empirical chips should fall where they may—something that we hope is more likely to the extent that academics
across the political spectrum recognize the tugs of their own
moral intuitions and intergroup identities when gauging evidence. This can only aid in the pursuit of truth and consequent
scientiﬁc consensus, to which we remain wholly committed. In
today’s highly polarized political climate, a better grasp of the
underpinnings of ideology—both inside and outside of academia—is sorely needed. We hope our report inspires future
inquiry of this nature.

Comments
R. Brian Ferguson
Graduate Program in Peace and Conﬂict Studies, Rutgers University,
603 Hill Hall, Newark, New Jersey 07102, USA (bfergusn@newark
.rutgers.edu). 13 X 18

Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham (HYK) conﬁrm that almost
all anthropologists position themselves from the center to the
left end of the political spectrum. Among anthropologists they
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences by gender, political orientation, and
subdisciplinary specialization in attitudes toward science, epistemology, advocacy, and “evolutionary biological explanations,”
and toward recent controversies that involve those broader
issues. Their ﬁndings are interesting, although not surprising,
and it is good to have some data.
HYK follow moral foundations theory (MFT), which proposes
speciﬁc cognitive orientations that are “innate and modular,
although revised by experience,” differentiating liberals from
conservatives. Much work is ongoing about the evolution of
human moral sensibility, and about neurobiological substrates of
political orientations, from many diverse perspectives. MFT
aligns with evolutionary psychology, an approach that has been
critiqued for its concept of massive modularity, its approach to
evolutionary process, and its lack of support from genetics,
neurobiology, and cognitive science. Criticism has been directed
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at MFT speciﬁcally (Suhler and Churchland 2011), of course
with rebuttal. So Haidt and Joseph (2011) respond to Suhler and
Churchland that they “have always treated moral modules as
functional modules, not as physical, anatomical or neurobiological modules” (2119). I am generally skeptical about innate
modularity of complex cognition and approaches based on that
premise. But I do not understand how this theoretical orientation
even applies to the data on hand? It is not about liberals versus
conservatives but rather self-identiﬁed moderates, liberals, and
radicals, plus gender and disciplinary specialization.
HYK elide attitudes about evolutionary or biological approaches to culture and behavior, with being pro- or antiscience.
No anthropologist is skeptical about evolutionary approaches
to evolution. The skepticism—I think—is about sociobiology,
evolutionary psychology, and the simplistic biologisms so common today. Genes widely publicized as affecting abusive behavior (MAOA) and depression (5-HTTLPR) were later found
to be, in those applications, nonexplanatory (Haberstick et al.
2014:25; Risch et al. 2009). Oxytocin, the famous trust hormone,
in meta-analysis is not reliably associated with trust (Nave
2015:772). Even for the language gene, FOXP2, its supposed
sweep of human populations was just found to be an inaccurate
result of the earlier sample. “New hypothesis for language
evolution needed!” (Atkinson et al. 2018). The list is easily extended. Many claimed biological breakthroughs about human
behavior have been walked back.
Single genes are not the same as the evolved cognitive modules. Even if conceptualized as predispositions to learn rather
than hardwiring, those are much more complex multigenic
traits that are far less subject to conﬁrmation or investigation
by contemporary physical sciences. Skepticism about them as
evolved adaptations is not antiscience but is rather consistent
with much research on neurobiological developmental plasticity, systemically interacting with environment at many levels.
HYK frame opinions about recent anthropological controversies as differentiating commitment to science, from “postmodern sentiments [that] endure in the discipline, undermining
scientists’ commitment to objectivity and capacity for dispassionate approximations of ‘truth.’” Women and leftists situate
themselves in moral communities that may “bind and blind”
them into “abandoning the scientiﬁc pursuit of truth.” “It appears that acknowledging an instinctual component of darker
aspects of human nature (e.g., intergroup violence, sexual possessiveness) runs headlong into the left’s intergroup identities
and underlying collective emotions.”
Sexual possessiveness falls within a larger discussion of gender differences. I would hazard, without statistics, that female
anthropologists have greater interest in that topic than males.
For those who study this area, there are sober, scientiﬁc, biosocial (beginning with the body) alternatives to evolved predispositions for all manner of gender specializations, including crossculturally common male efforts to control female sexuality (Eagly
and Wood 2003). There may be greater awareness of excesses of
proclaimed evolutionary science, such as men having an evolved
psychological module for rape (Travis 2003). They may know
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better that sociobiology was employed from the get-go to undermine feminist objectives (Gould 1978). They are probably
more attuned to the androcentrism of Chagnon’s portrayal of
Yanomami. These are all good reasons for skepticism.
Skepticism of “tribal conﬂict” as “a principal selective force that
shaped human nature,” or the “instinctual component of . . .
intergroup violence” is not antiscientiﬁc, although it is regularly
tarred as political correctness. Dispassionate investigation from
phylogeny (Gomez et al. 2016), archaeology (Ferguson 2013a,
2013b), and ethnology (Fry and Soderberg 2014) soundly refutes
the evolutionary position of ubiquitous war through our species’
past. (On Chagnon’s role in fomenting conﬂict among Yanomami, and the validity of his claims of higher reproductive
success, see Ferguson 2015b; on the scientiﬁc status of Cochran
et al. [2006] on Ashkenazi intelligence, see Ferguson, unpublished manuscript, 2008).
HYK do not evaluate the merits of particular positions not
relevant to their study. Certainly most anthropologists do not
know the details of controversies. General reactions are shaped
by their larger orientations, as HYK propose. The troubling
subtext is how these ﬁndings will be read and cited.
The takeaway for many will be that criticism of such biological or evolutionary positions by anthropologists is political,
not scientiﬁc. That is the standard refrain of sociobiologists
and evolutionary psychologists. This article facilitates a political defense of positions that are challenged on empirical and
theoretical grounds. Informed skepticism about general research
orientations and rigorous criticism about particular ﬁndings
based on those orientations is not antiscience, but practicing science.

Douglas P. Fry and Geneviève Souillac
Department of Anthropology, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama 35205, USA (dfry@uab.edu).
14 IX 18

We wish to thank the authors for their thought-provoking
article. Whether considering the researchers’ assessments of
speciﬁc controversies or the more general items of the survey,
we think that the main takeaway message is the need for serious self-reﬂection within our discipline. In seeing these ﬁndings
as a call for self-contemplation by anthropologists, we are not
advocating the return to the ’90s style of book forewords that
divulged information about authors, but rather we are calling
for serious self-reﬂection about assumptions, cultural beliefs,
theory, training, and disciplinary history and how such factors
inﬂuence the thinking and practice of anthropological science
and scholarship.
One way to deal with biases is to regularly critique one’s own
assumptions, motives, methods, and interpretations before manuscripts even go out for peer review. Clearly, a host of personal
features, cultural beliefs, and theoretical biases can creep into
research and interpretive processes. It could be useful if
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anthropologists applied their knowledge about the learning and
transmission of shared beliefs to their own academic thinking
and writing. In considering the differences regarding respondents’ subdisciplines, genders, and political orientations, Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham offer an interpretation based on
how scholars who share underlying moral emotions “tend to
gravitate (consciously or unconsciously) toward interpretive and
emotive communities.” This may be true, but we wonder whether
it might be useful to conceptualize the survey results as reﬂecting
variations of belief systems, or different academic milieux, depending on subﬁeld, gender, or political views, that is, to apply
anthropological constructs to anthropologists themselves.
The type of self-reﬂective questions we think could be
useful for a scientist or scholar include: Do I really have hard
data to back up my interpretations? Are my methodological
decisions as unbiased as possible? What would a skeptic say
about my techniques and interpretations that would be valid
points to consider?
The survey ﬁndings show anthropologists to be split on the
item about peacefulness in prehistory prior to the development
of agriculture. This is an area that we think could beneﬁt from
greater attention by researchers to the history and philosophy
of science; a careful scrutiny of sampling, methods, and interpretations; a holistic consideration of multiple data types
(e.g., Holocene archaeological sequences on the origins of war,
social complexity, ecology and demography, nomadic forager
social organization, the ethology of mammalian aggression
and restraint, and so on); and last but not least, honest selfreﬂection—to the greatest degree possible—about one’s own
biases, motivations, and assumptions. If the goal in science is
the pursuit of truth and understanding, then publications that
draw upon cherry-picked samples, misrepresent the nature
of the data, muddle key concepts, or ignore contradictory
ﬁndings harm the practice of science and the ﬁeld of anthropology (see Fry 2013, 2018; Fry and Söderberg 2014).
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham also report that anthropologists remain divided regarding what to make of Napoleon
Chagnon’s (1988) claim that Yanomamö killers have more offspring. In his memoirs, Chagnon (2013) criticizes his anthropological colleagues for being biased and unscientiﬁc, but he does
not engage in the type of self-reﬂections that could beneﬁt the
practice of science. Chagnon (2013) simply republishes the
original killers-have-more-kids ﬁndings without any serious
engagement with the methodological, mathematical, and interpretive critiques of his original study (e.g., Albert 1989; Ferguson 1989, 1995; Fry 2006; Lizot and Dart 1994; Miklikowska
and Fry 2012; Moore 1990) and without any mention of studies
on the Waorani and the Cheyenne that report the opposite of
his Yanomamö ﬁndings—namely, that killers leave fewer offspring than nonkillers (Beckerman et al. 2009; Moore 1990).
Chagnon (2013) shows no willingness to rethink his original
methods or interpretations in light of various kinds of critiques
and subsequent ﬁndings reported over a 25-year period. Whereas
closed-mindedness is antithetical to good science, the striving
by researchers for high standards, self-awareness, and con-
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sciousness about their own motivations and biases can aid the
scientiﬁc endeavor.
Charles Darwin, as he contemplated and gathered various
kinds of data in support of his theory of evolution through natural
selection, did engage in self-critique and self-reﬂection. Darwin
([1887] 1958) insightfully realized his own tendency to dismiss
observations that seemed to be unsupportive of his theorizing,
writing in his autobiography, “I had, also, during many years,
followed a golden rule, namely, that whenever a published fact,
a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it
without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such
facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory
than favorable ones” (123). We think anthropologists could
learn from Darwin’s mindful and meticulous approach. Unfortunately, today one does not have to look very far to ﬁnd
examples of writers selectively including only material that
matches their arguments or that corresponds with their pet
speculations, while simultaneously ignoring or even misrepresenting ﬁndings that contradict their views.
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham point out that according
to moral foundations theory, people are typically unaware of
the moral intuitions affecting their judgment. While not a
panacea, we suggest that researchers can regularly ask themselves self-reﬂective questions and in so doing become less
biased: What are my personal biases (political, cultural, theoretical, and so on)? Why do I have these biases? How did I get
them? What implicit assumptions do I hold on the topics I
study? How does the history of my subdiscipline and my training milieu in particular affect my thinking? What motivates
me to do my science or scholarship? In my work, how can I use
the most rigorous scholarship and methods? Am I true to
seeking the truth, or do other factors inﬂuence my thinking and
motivations (fame, glory, winning a debate, etc.)? How open
am I to changing my mind when presented with new data or
new interpretations that better ﬁt the facts?

William Jankowiak
Department of Anthropology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
Nevada 89154, USA (jankbill@unlv.nevada.edu). 24 VIII 18

Academia, like most communities that are conscious of being
a community, seldom enjoys being the subject of an analytical critique that reveals tacit bias and unvoiced, albeit often
acted upon, political positions. This is especially so when that
community frequently claims it is a society of concerned
thinkers interested in the discovery of truth. But what is
truth, Pontius Pilate asked Jesus?
In this thoughtful overview, the authors provide us with a
road map of tacit predispositions that many academics bring
to the analysis of their own data as well as those of others. In
the resulting intramural scrimmage, we are asked to once again
revisit Max Weber’s masterful analysis of the role of objectivity
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in the social sciences. Roy D’Andrade in his 1995 Current Anthropology article sought to prod the ﬁeld into reengaging with
Weber’s ﬁrm conviction that objective analysis can exist within
a moral universe. His call for an open dialogue was overwhelmingly greeted with the reassertion that the best most “objective”
analysis acts as a moral defense of the people we study. The
implication is that because truth is socially constructed, we
should focus on what we deem to be moral truths, which are
objective enough.
Given that Donald Trump is the ﬁrst postmodern president
to not only embrace the relativity of truth but also advance the
subjectivity of truth, that is, whatever he wants it to be, endorsed by a recent Trump spokesperson who informed us that
the “truth isn’t truth,” (Moore 2018) it should come as a refreshing reminder that when taken to extremes, such a slippery
view renders impossible any objective study to identify behavioral patterns and the reasons for their appearance, continuation, and disappearance. In an increasingly insecure
culture where the nature of truth is up for grabs, we as a discipline may be devolving into little more than some kind of
association grounded in the ethics of social justice and deﬁned
by the instability of our often-shifting core values and personal
preferences.
Here the authors are spot-on in recognizing that we have
formed competing epistemological tribes that talk past each
other—if we can assume that another person is even listening.
We no longer argue with interpretations that we disagree with
but rather refuse to recognize that those interpretations were
ever published or even exist. In the intramural back and forth,
we have lost the beneﬁt of being intellectually pushed out of
our comfort zones. This raises an important and troubling
question: Is there any meaningful beneﬁt to having a multiplicity of perspectives? The answer should be of course there is,
but it currently does not go without saying; it happens only if
we actually talk to each other and not disengage or dismiss
views and interpretations for which we have no sympathy.
The authors are furthermore correct in showing that one of
the core dividing lines derives from our persistent skepticism
about the value of biology in contributing to the understanding
of human behavior. The ongoing withdrawal from, when not
outright rejection of, the psychoanalytical paradigm has landed
anthropology on the shakiest of terrain—a discipline with a
once historically articulated mission to study both the subjective
and objective dimensions of human behavior is now erratic in its
attitudes and benighted in its mission.
A few anthropologists adopted a cognitive model of the mind,
but this approach does not seem to have attracted a wide interest
or dependable focus, thus leaving it on the discipline’s periphery.
Given the absence of a viable conceptual framework for probing
the subjective sphere of the mental life, it is not surprising (although it does seem to have surprised many) that evolutionary
psychology gradually replaced the Freudian paradigm. Over time
the evolutionary approach brought biology back prominently
into the equation. For most cultural anthropologists, the reintroduction of biology, no matter how seemingly valid, was
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greeted with intense, almost irrational, resistance, accompanied by an insistence that there is nothing new to examine or
reinterpret because everything is social and that is that. The byproduct of rejecting psychoanalytical and evolutionary analysis has left us without an agreed-upon “psychology of humanness.” By default, most of the ﬁeld is stymied by some de
facto tabula rasa (publicly rejected while privately tolerated)
that elevates social structure or society over everything else.
Since societal forces accordingly shaped everything, there was
no need to engage with psychological research or its ﬁndings.
But without concurrence of conceptual framework or language
in which to discuss the subjective sphere, many anthropologists have been inclined to sidestep, if not reject, the exploration of the subjective in favor of personalized ethics.
The retreat into conceptual or, in the authors’ words, moral
emotional camps of epistemological faith has resulted in a dilution of intellectual skepticism, diminishing the willingness to
question underlying assumptions and the conclusions that follow from them. A new kind of cultural anthropology has taken
over: a morally engaged social activism.
The authors’ survey further reveals that this shift in intellectual orientation wears a political and gendered face. The
authors do not comment on this, but I suspect that the political orientation wears an additional face: one of class. It is
increasingly more common in research universities, and especially Ivy League institutions, than it is in rank-and-ﬁle
state universities. An important question has come into play:
Do we assess a person’s character by how he or she views the
world? That is, if we identify with the view, do we therefore
think highly of the person? Or if we do we not agree with the
view, do we therefore think little of the person?
If so, can we as a discipline objectively analyze the work of
people whose theoretical orientations we do not like? This
should not be surprising, given that our political and social
identities have merged together so that one predicts the other,
so one depends on the other.
Given these personalized analytical preferences, we are
faced with a practical issue: How can journal submissions
receive a more balanced and useful review? After reading this
modest and thoughtful analysis, I wonder whether editors,
when selecting reviewers, should not take into consideration
a reviewer’s political orientation as well as his or her given
expertise. I also wonder whether, 20 years from now, Current
Anthropology will once again publish papers dealing with the
ﬁeld’s reluctance to engage Weber’s challenge to distinguish
the personal from the objective.

Peter N. Peregrine
Department of Anthropology, Lawrence University, 711 East Boldt
Way, Appleton, Wisconsin 54911, USA (peter.n.peregrine@
lawrence.edu). 16 VIII 18

Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham have provided an interesting picture of the continuing division between proscience and
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antiscience factions within anthropology. As they note, the removal of the term “science” from the American Anthropological Association’s (AAA) mission statement as it was presented
in the 2010 Long Range Planning Committee (LRPC) report
was the catalyst for a vocal critique of the AAA and its leadership. An important issue that the controversy focused on was
AAA leadership, a focus that Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham do not carefully examine. What I provide here is a personal
and admittedly subjective history of the growing frustration
with AAA leadership that played a seminal role in the 2010
controversy.
Conﬂict with AAA leadership simmered throughout the
Darkness in El Dorado controversy and boiled over in 2002
when the AAA’s executive board (EB) accepted the Darkness
in El Dorado task force’s report. The report violated the very
ethics guidelines that supposedly underlay the task force’s
work, and one only needs to read Anthropology News from
2002 and 2003 to see that many AAA members viewed the
report not only as damaging to the AAA’s reputation but also
as creating distrust of anthropologists among indigenous
communities and potentially undermining efforts to carry out
large-scale inoculation programs.
Accepting the task force report was not the only divisive
action made by AAA leadership in 2002. Another such action
involved the rejection of several scientiﬁc panels—panels having
National Academy members and other senior anthropologists
as organizers or presenters—which were subsequently left out
of the program for the 2002 annual meeting in New Orleans. In
response, a group of disgruntled anthropologists organized a
salon des refusés meeting held parallel to the AAA meetings
and made up of the rejected panels and several others. AAA
leadership was not happy about this, and some members expressed their displeasure in impolitic ways. The direct result
was the creation of the Society for Anthropological Sciences
(SASci) and a movement to create a separate section within the
AAA for scientiﬁc anthropology (in part because sections were
allowed two symposia at the annual meeting).
In 2003, a resolution was put forward that repudiated the
accusation that Napoleon Chagnon and James Neel had fostered a measles epidemic among the Yanomami. The resolution
caused considerable debate within the AAA and in fact was
declared null and void by the EB due to errors in its wording,
although swirling gossip suggested that the EB did not want
the resolution introduced because of pressure from the task
force and several members who held personal grudges against
Chagnon. Signiﬁcantly, when the resolution was reintroduced
it passed overwhelmingly—1,526 to 134—suggesting that AAA
leadership either was either out of touch with the members or
being disproportionally inﬂuenced by a small group of members
working to keep the resolution from being introduced.
The following year, concerns about small groups inﬂuencing
leadership expanded when the EB decided to move the annual
meeting from San Francisco to Atlanta without consulting
section leadership. The move had reasoning behind it—the
conference hotel had locked out its unionized workers in a labor
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dispute, and unionized AAA members refused to attend the
meeting and raised the issue that the AAA should side with
labor and not management in this dispute. There was a ballot
and the move did pass. But the vote was done quickly, sent only
to those who had registered for the meeting, and had a very low
response rate. The impact on attendees, particularly graduate
students and contingent faculty, was dramatic, as was the ﬁnancial impact on the AAA itself due to canceled contracts
with the Hilton Corporation. The decision to move the meeting
suggested that AAA leadership had become more interested in
social activism than in representing the needs of its members
(again, all one needs to do is skim through Anthropology News
for the months following the meeting to see how strong the
concerns over leadership had become).
For ﬁve years, SASci worked with AAA to create a section.
This proved more difﬁcult than expected. Vigorous pushback
came from several members of the EB, who argued that anthropology was a science and that there was no reason for such
a society under the AAA umbrella. In essence, their argument
was that the AAA was already a society for anthropological
sciences, but despite this pushback the Society for Anthropological Sciences (SAS—organizationally separate from SASci,
although in practice the same) became a provisional section of
the AAA in 2007.
In SAS’s ﬁrst Anthropology News column, Stephen Lyon
(2008) explained why SAS was created: “The new section is an
important addition toward fulﬁlling the AAA mission to promote anthropological sciences.” Two years later, the LRPC removed the word “science” from the AAA mission statement. As
then-president of SAS, I viewed this removal as not only an attack on scientiﬁc methods in anthropology but also a direct attack on the newly created SAS. We were a “provisional” section
at that point, one that at least some members of the EB disliked
and I feared might act to remove—if science were no longer part
of the AAA mission, then why have SAS as part of the AAA?
For me, the “science” controversy was as much about a
decade-long bias in AAA leadership as it was about divisions
among AAA membership. Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham
illustrate that divisions among anthropologists still exist and
are a cause for concern, but that is only one aspect of the bigger
story behind the controversy. The failure of AAA leadership to
balance these divisions was equally to blame.

Peter Wood
National Association of Scholars, 420 Madison Avenue, 7th Floor,
New York, New York 10017, USA (pwood@nas.org). 6 IX 18

Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham question whether anthropology is “divided between proscience and antiscience
factions.” Their primary evidence is survey questions framed
in “familiar and unambiguous language.”
“Familiar” and “unambiguous” are not the same thing. The
ﬁrst question asks whether respondents agree that “scientiﬁc
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advances have improved well-being.” An overwhelming majority (89%) responded positively. On its face, that puts to rest
the claim that anthropology has fractured between pro- and
antiscience factions.
But that large majority masks deep divisions in all three key
terms: science, advances, and well-being. Someone who agrees
with the proposition that advances in plant science have improved food security and human nourishment might well disagree with the proposition that advances in the scientiﬁc study
of kinship systems during the colonial era improved the administration of colonial law and the welfare of subject populations. The disagreement in this case is not merely a matter of
the substantive claims. It involves different ideas of science, advances, and well-being.
The ambiguities go even deeper. Some anthropologists hold
that ethnographic approaches that emphasize the emotions,
personal insights, and experiences of the ﬁeldworker are an
advance in the science of anthropology that beneﬁts the subjects of research. Other anthropologists decry such methods as
profoundly unscientiﬁc. Are “interpretive ethnographies” a form
of “science,” or are they a branch of imaginative literature?
The word “science” generally retains positive connotations,
and even those who reject much of what science has entailed
historically may fancy themselves in favor of “science” as
something taking place in a laboratory or as a general rubric
for their own not-very-scientiﬁc work. “Science” conceived as
something so elastic as to encompass nearly any practice is not
science. The “science” of palm reading is not science.
The basic thesis of the article is thus doubtful, although the
authors go on to offer much of interest. Horowitz, Yaworsky,
and Kickham evoke the divisions among anthropologists over
how “engaged” the discipline should be with power, political
responsibility, and “authoritative representations.” Their treatments of the controversies over Chagnon, Stoll, and Freeman
are framed as efforts not “to adjudicate conﬂicting claims” but
to disentangle “the empirical and the normative” elements in the
disputes. In this effort they are moderately successful, although
Sahlins’s denunciation of Chagnon’s ﬁeld methods, Pratt’s
(and others’) rebukes to Stoll, and Shankman’s attack on Freeman are presented as though their points remained unanswered.
Granted it was not the authors’ goal to give a rounded picture of
these controversies but rather to provide a springboard to a key
question: Does distrust toward scientiﬁc objectivity characterize
contemporary anthropology? Their summary of the Chagnon,
Stoll, and Freeman affairs strongly suggests that the answer is yes,
at least for a prominent segment of the anthropological community—notwithstanding the overall results of their survey.
Their survey does, nevertheless, provide a valuable index of
how deeply antiscience epistemology has rooted itself in the
discipline. That nearly one-third (31%) of anthropologists hold
that indigenous cosmologies are “no less” true than modern
scientiﬁc explanations is astonishing. If we look at the American
academy at large, we know where we are most likely to ﬁnd
faculty members who believe that witchcraft explains infectious
disease to a degree comparable with microbes; that sorcery explains success in growing food crops at least as well as seed stock,
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fertilizing, and adequate irrigation; and that various deities explain the apparent motion of the planets and stars at least as well
as modern astronomy. Do 31% of anthropologists really uphold
this sort of crude relativism?
I suspect that a much smaller percentage would stake their
health or their lives on the “truth” of Azande medicine or
Trobriand garden magic, but the willingness of so many to
afﬁrm “no less true” in response to a survey question plainly
registers a widespread social attitude. The authors draw from
this the bland observation that “the ambivalence of the ﬁeld
regarding epistemology is unmistakable.” They also capture
the contradiction between the strong relativistic stand on
“indigenous cosmologies” and the emphatic support (89%) for
the UN Declaration of Human Rights, although the percentage
that countenance female genital mutilation (28%) tracks pretty
closely with the percentage of those who ﬁnd indigenous
cosmologies “no less true” (31%).
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham offer an explanation for
all this that makes a good deal of sense, although it by no
means upholds the principle that anthropology as presently
construed can be treated as a serious science. Moral foundations theory, they write, suggests that “more is going on than
simply intellectual disagreement about the credibility of available evidence.” The epistemological disagreements are really
surface manifestations of the moral template of the group to
which the anthropologists belong. In this instance, the political
left in anthropology ﬁnds its group foundations in “care and
fairness,” which “saturate” its “political morality.” The anthropologists drawn into this charmed circle “come together in
emotive communities [that] would reproduce a discourse of
moral responsibility toward subaltern groups.”
As the authors present themselves as “part of the left-liberal
camp,” and conclude their paper by afﬁrming that they are situated not “above the fray” but with their “fellow left-liberal colleagues,” I am willing to accept their confession of bad faith. Their
commitment to “the pursuit of truth” and to “science,” which is
also reiterated in the last paragraph, sits awkwardly alongside
their other commitment. Indeed, the “group” identity they claim
and their belief that its moral foundation in the pursuit of an
emotive and therapeutic ethic of care and fairness plainly
supersedes any mere intellectual attachment to science or truth.
The article thus turns back on itself in a wide circle. The
authors end up providing substantial new evidence that supports
the picture of a rift in anthropology between those who adhere to
actual scientiﬁc standards and those who reject science in favor
of something else. What they have clariﬁed is that the “something else” isn’t exactly “antiscience.” It includes antiscience, but
it is better understood as the self-regard of a moral clerisy.

Reply
We thank the commentators for their thoughtful reﬂections
on our paper. It is gratifying to have our work appraised by
such distinguished scholars.
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R. Brian Ferguson takes issue with evolutionary psychology,
particularly its conception of the brain’s functional modularity,
which has afﬁnities with moral foundations theory (MFT). He
points to various evolutionary hypotheses that had to be walked
back, including ballyhooed genetic or dispositional accounts of
such diverse phenomena as language, abusive behavior, depression, and even rape. He cautions that this should make us
skeptical of sociobiology.
Fair enough. We hardly endorse evolutionary psychology
wholesale, much less genetic reductionism. We are open, moreover, to ongoing discoveries in brain science suggesting farreaching developmental plasticity. As we stressed, our use of
MFT was tentative. It strikes us as a plausible explanation of
average emotive differences between the left and the right. It is
an explanation, we might add, with a feasible evolutionary
backstory (of adaptive moral emotions) and consistent with
large-scale twin studies on the substantial heritability of virtually all psychological traits, including political orientation
(Hatemi et al. 2014).
Ferguson expresses confusion, however, regarding the applicability of MFT: “I do not understand how this theoretical orientation even applies to the data on hand? [sic] It is not about
liberals versus conservatives but self-identiﬁed moderates,
liberals, and radicals, plus gender and disciplinary specialization.” Notwithstanding that MFT has been applied, independent of political ideology, to gender, occupation, and more
(e.g., Graham et al. 2011), here we assumed our reasoning was
plain. Probing anthropologists’ views from the far-left to the
political middle (given virtually no conservatives or libertarians
in the ﬁeld), we suspect a tempering in the intensity of their leftwing moral sensibilities (i.e., their collective instincts to protect
vulnerable groups and to mistrust “authoritative” claims perceived to derogate such groups). Indeed, we interpret the predictive power of political orientation in our data in precisely
these terms. Recall moderate anthropologists’ more pronounced
tendency to reject epistemic relativism and to afﬁrm evolutionary biology and Chagnon’s legacy (with correspondingly
less congenial views of indigenous cosmologies, alleged prehistoric peaceableness, and promiscuity, etc.).
Oddly, Ferguson skirts this central thrust of our ﬁndings.
Perhaps due to MFT’s innatist footing, he appears intent to
dwell on what he sees as the project’s normative implications.
He cites a variety of work (including his own) that “soundly
refutes” evolutionary accounts of prehistoric war, Yanomami
reproductive success, or the merits of Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending’s (2006) thesis on Ashkenazi intelligence. He views
these “rigorous criticism[s]” of sociobiology as “dispassionate”
and “informed skepticism,” unduly dismissed as “politically
correct,” and he worries that our paper provides a “political
defense” for evolutionary positions challenged on expressly
“empirical” and “theoretical” grounds.
Maybe. As we concede throughout, we do not aim to adjudicate the controversies. If Ferguson is right, it happens that the
more left-leaning anthropologists better track the truth in their
views on these sensitive questions. Many moderate colleagues
would no doubt demur. We can only advise caution. Awareness
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of ourselves as both scientiﬁc and emotive communities may
help explain why our politics tends to align with our interpretations of evidence. That Ferguson sidesteps this essential connection is a pity.
Douglas Fry and Geneviève Souillac highlight our desire
for anthropologists to engage in serious self-reﬂection about
biases. We welcome their suggestion that our survey results
could be usefully interpreted with other frameworks. They
offer a host of questions that scholars might bring to bear in
their research in a spirit of critical reﬂexivity.
We certainly claim no settled position on prehistoric war or
Chagnon’s (in)famous killers-have-more-kids ﬁnding. With
respect to Fry and Souillac’s critique of Chagnon, we would
expect work that piques the moral emotions of a ﬁeld to invite
a range of interpretive and other challenges. A higher level of
methodological scrutiny perhaps goes with the territory. Time
may tell, in any event, whether special attention to evolved
moral intuitions bears scientiﬁc fruit.
Fry and Souillac suggest that anthropologists should better
attend to the history and philosophy of science. For what it’s
worth, although hardly professional philosophers of science, we
are drawn to a middle ground between realism and constructionism. After all, our theories are constrained both by the facts
“out there” and by our cultural precepts and interests as knowledge producers. We wonder whether scholars’ attraction to
these philosophical stances might coincide in some way with
their respective moral intuitions. (A question for future study
perhaps.)
We appreciate William Jankowiak’s laudatory appraisal of
our project. Echoing Wrong’s (1961) classic critique of sociology,
Jankowiak laments what he sees as inadequate psychological
grounding in anthropology’s analyses of human behavior. He
ﬁnds more to lament, in fact, in the drift of postmodern relativism from the humanities and social sciences into—of all
places—the Republican Party. In such an “insecure culture,”
where truth is “up for grabs,” anthropology founders by disavowing psychoanalytic or evolutionary insights into human
subjectivity.
Jankowiak ﬁnds much to recommend in our sketch of the
ﬁeld’s “epistemological tribes.” His concern that anthropologists
too often talk past each other or refuse to recognize opposing
interpretations seems, sadly, to ring true. While praising our
emphasis on contrasting moral emotions, he goes further in
proposing a class dimension to anthropology’s relativist-activist
subculture. We ﬁnd the hypothesis intriguing. His astute observation reminds us of the anthropologist-cum-journalist Sarah Kendzior’s (2012) wry portrayal of the plight of debt-ridden
adjuncts at an AAA conference. We cannot help but quote
Kendzior: “When I expressed doubt about the job market to one
colleague, she advised me, with total seriousness, to ‘re-evaluate
what work means’ and to consider ‘post-work imaginaries.’”
Whatever the reach of such a “patrician” sensibility, we welcome
efforts to map anthropology’s emotive terrain beyond our focus
on moral intuitions.
We learned much by reading Peter Peregrine’s analysis of the
AAA’s inner workings. His observations provide useful context
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for our paper. Peregrine’s comments about the sudden change of
venue from San Francisco to Atlanta dovetail with the concerns
raised in the abovementioned Kendzior essay. His observations
about the refusal of the AAA to host some of the scientiﬁc panels
also corresponds with Jankowiak’s position of a ﬁeld talking past
each other. We are delighted this forum provided a space for
Peregrine to share his important account of leadership dynamics
in the AAA.
Peter Wood draws attention to some of the ambiguities in
our questionnaire. Arriving at sureﬁre language in a survey is
well-nigh impossible. That does not invalidate his criticism,
but about all we can say is that we did our best and the significant results and patterns are not easily explained away. Wood
suggests that although our thesis is “doubtful,” we “offer much
of interest,” and he evaluates us as being “moderately successful”
at disentangling the empirical and normative aspects of anthropology’s controversies. He notes the contribution we made
by documenting the depths of “antiscience epistemology” in the
ﬁeld. And he ﬁnds that our explanation makes “a good deal of
sense.”
We are of course pleased with these assessments. Wood in fact
captures a key thread of our argument well: “The epistemological
disagreements are really surface manifestations of the moral
template of the group to which the anthropologists belong.” Yet
in elaborating, he makes inﬂated claims that appear to render our
argument contradictory. Wood suggests, for example, that our
open identiﬁcation as left-liberals amounts to a “confession of
bad faith,” which he accepts. It is not altogether clear what he
means. Apparently he views political commitment as inherently
antithetical to the pursuit of scientiﬁc truth. The authors’ “commitment” as left-liberals, he notes, “sits awkwardly alongside”
their “commitment to the ‘pursuit of truth’ and to ‘science.’” He
continues with his most provocative point, which we should
quote at length: “Indeed, the ‘group’ identity they claim and
their belief that its moral foundation in the pursuit of an emotive
and therapeutic ethic of care and fairness plainly supersedes any
mere intellectual attachment to science or truth.”
Here we believe Wood overplays his hand. We demonstrate,
to be sure, the impact of scholars’ moral intuitions on their
interpretations of evidence. Our attention to the “politics of
knowledge” certainly contravenes naive views of value-free
knowledge production in the academy. Yet must we bend the
stick so far as to reduce social science to a jockeying over
identity and values?
In his intuitionist model of moral reasoning, Jonathan Haidt
(2012) designates our reasoning faculty the “rider” and our underlying moral intuitions, the “elephant.” Drawing on David
Hume, Haidt stresses that the elephant usually rules the day,
dwarﬁng the inﬂuence of the tiny rider. Yet again, we stress
usually. Haidt differs from Hume in suggesting that the rider acts
as a lawyer and that the lawyer can sometimes persuade the
client, overriding her underlying emotions. That is to say, reason
is the lawyer and sometimes the lawyer’s counsel has effect. This
is our fundamental point. If we wish to overcome the blunders
caused by our biased attachments to our seemingly intractable
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moral foundations, then we had better heed the lawyer when the
lawyer is informed by science. This is by no means an easy task.
But we reiterate, and we believe without contradiction, that recognizing our emotive roadblocks might just clear a path to better
approach the truth.
—Mark Horowitz, William Yaworsky,
and Kenneth Kickham

References Cited
Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2002. Do Muslim women really need saving? anthropological reﬂections on cultural relativism and its others. American Anthropologist 104(3):783–790.
Albert, Bruce. 1989. Yanomami violence: inclusive ﬁtness or ethnographer’s
representation? Current Anthropology 30(5):637–640.
Arias, Arturo. 2001. The Rigoberta Menchú controversy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Atkinson, Elizabeth Grace, Amanda Jane Audesse, Julia Adela Palacios, Dean
Michael Bobo, Ashley Elizabeth Webb, Sohini Ramachandran, and Brenna
Mariah Henn. 2018. No evidence for recent selection at FOXP2 among
diverse human populations. Cell 174:1424–1435. [RBF]
Bagish, Henry H. 1981. Confessions of a former cultural relativist. Santa Barbara,
CA: Santa Barbara City College Publications.
Baron-Cohen, Simon. 2009. The essential difference: male and female brains
and the truth about autism. London: Penguin.
Beckerman, S., P. Erickson, J. Yost, J. Regalado, L. Jaramillo, C. Sparks,
M. Iromenga, and K. Long. 2009. Life histories, blood revenge, and reproductive success among the Waorani of Ecuador. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the USA 106:8134–8139. [DPF/GS]
Block, Jack, and Jeanne H. Block. 2006. Nursery school personality and
political orientation two decades later. Journal of Research in Personality
40(5):734–749.
Boas, Franz. 1912. Changes in bodily form of descendants of immigrants. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Burgos-Debray, Elisabeth. 1983. I, Rigoberta Menchú. London: Verso.
Carneiro de Cunha, and Maria Manuela. 1989. Letter from the ABA and response
by Chagnon. http://www.angelﬁre.com/sk2/title/ucsbpreliminaryreport.pdf
(accessed September 22, 2016).
Chagnon, Napoleon. 1988. Life histories, blood revenge, and warfare in a
tribal population. Science 239(4843):985–992.
———. 2013. Noble savages: my life among two dangerous tribes—the
Yanomamö and the anthropologists. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Christov-Moore, Leonardo, Elizabeth A. Simpson, Gino Coude, Kristina Grigaityte, Marco Iacoboni, and Pier F. Ferrari. 2014. Empathy: gender effects in
brain and behavior. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 46:604–627.
Clifford, James. 2015. Feeling historical. In Writing culture and the life of
anthropology. O Starn, ed. Pp. 25–34. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Cochran, Gregory, Jason Hardy, and Henry Harpending. 2006. Natural history of Ashkenazi intelligence. Journal of Biosocial Science 38(5):659–693.
Coop, Graham. 2014. Letter to the editor. New York Times Book Review,
August 8, 2014.
Custred, Glynn. 2016. Turning anthropology from science into political activism.
In James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal. http://www.jamesgmartin
.center/2016/02/turning-anthropology-from-science-into-political-activism
(accessed January 3, 2017).
D’Andrade, Roy. 1995. Moral models in anthropology. Current Anthropology
36(3):399–408.
Darwin, C. (1887) 1958. The autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809–1882.
New York: Norton. [DPF/GS]
Dreger, Alice. 2010. No science, please: we’re anthropologists. Psychology Today,
November 25, 2010.
D’Souza, Dinesh. 1998. I, Rigoberta Menchú . . . not! Washington Examiner,
December, 28, 1998.
Eagly, Alice H., and Wendy Wood. 2003. The origins of sex differences in
human behavior: evolved disposition versus social roles. In Evolution, gender, and rape. Cheryl Brown Travis, ed. Pp. 265–304. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press. [RBF]
Eakin, Emily. 2013. How Napoleon Chagnon became our most controversial
anthropologist. New York Times Magazine, February 13, 2013. http://

This content downloaded from 129.113.053.071 on November 11, 2019 09:25:50 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham

Anthropology’s Science Wars

www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/magazine/napoleon-chagnon-americas-most
-controversial-anthropologist.html (accessed August 3, 2016).
Ferguson, R. B. 1989. Do Yanomamö killers have more kids? American Ethnologist 16:564–565. [DPF/GS]
———. 1995. Yanomami warfare: a political history. Santa Fe, NM: School
for Advanced Research.
———. 2008. How Jews became smart: anti-“natural history of Ashkenazi
intelligence.” Unpublished manuscript. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1eed
/b19bcf7c059a4b10a9ed8c58027d9ed22bae.pdf. [RBF]
———. 2013a. Pinker’s list: exaggerating prehistoric war mortality. In War,
peace, and human nature: convergence of evolutionary and cultural views.
Douglas Fry, ed. Pp. 112–131. New York: Oxford University Press. [RBF]
———. 2013b. The prehistory of war and peace in Europe and the Near East.
In War, peace, and human nature: convergence of evolutionary and cultural
views. Douglas Fry, ed. Pp. 191–240. New York: Oxford University Press.
[RBF]
———. 2015a. Comments on the working paper 2.4 of the AAA El Dorado task
force: involvement in the Yanomami political affairs. http://anthroniche.com
/darkness_documents/0100.htm (accessed July 4, 2016).
———. 2015b. History, explanation, and war among the Yanomami: a response
to Chagnon’s Noble Savages. Anthropological Theory 15:377–406. [RBF]
Ferman, Claudia. 2001. Textual truth, historical truth and media truth. In The
Rigoberta Menchú controversy. Arturo Arias, ed. Pp. 156–170. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota.
Freeman, Derek. 1983. Margaret Mead and Samoa: the making and unmaking
of an anthropological myth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 1999. The fateful hoaxing of Margaret Mead: a historical analysis of
her Samoan research. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Fry, D. P. 2006. The human potential for peace: an anthropological challenge to
assumptions about war and violence. New York: Oxford University Press.
[DPF/GS]
———. 2013. War, peace, and human nature: the challenge of achieving
scientiﬁc objectivity. In War, peace, and human nature: convergence of
evolutionary and cultural views. Douglas P. Fry, ed. Pp. 1–21. New York:
Oxford University Press. [DPF/GS]
———. 2018. The evolutionary logic of human peaceful behavior. In Peace
ethology: behavioral processes and systems of peace. Peter Verbeek and
Bengamin A. Peters, eds. Pp. 249–265. New York: Wiley. [DPF/GS]
———. 2014. Myths about hunter-gatherers redux: nomadic forager war
and peace. Journal of Aggression, Conﬂict and Peace Research 6:255–266.
[DPF/GS]
Gill, George W. 2000. Does race exist? a proponent’s perspective. Nova. February 14, 2000. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/evolution/does-race-exist.html
(accessed October 1, 2016).
Golden, Serena. 2013. A protest resignation. Inside Higher Ed. https://www
.insidehighered.com/news/2013/02/25/prominent-anthropologist-resigns-protest
-national-academy-sciences (accessed June 24, 2016).
Gomez, Jose Maria, Miguel Verdu, Adela Gonzalez-Megias, and Marcos
Mendez. 2016. The phylogenetic roots of human lethal violence. Nature
538:233–237. [RBF]
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1997. Evolution: the pleasures of pluralism. New York Review
of Books, June 26, 1997.
———. 1978. Sociobiology: the art of storytelling. New Scientist, November 16, 1978, 930–933. [RBF]
Graham, Jesse, Brian A. Nosek, Jonathan Haidt, Ravi Iyer, Spassena Koleva,
and Peter H. Ditto. 2011. Mapping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101(2):366–385.
Gross, Neil. 2013. Why are professors liberal and why do conservatives care?
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gross, Neil, and Solon Simmons. 2007. The social and political views of American
professors. Working paper, September 24, 2007. https://www.conservative
criminology.com (accessed September 15, 2016).
Haberstick, Brett C., Jeffrey M. Lessem, John K. Hewitt, Andrew Smolen,
Christian J. Hopfer, Carolyn T. Halpern, Ley A. Killeya-Jones, et al. 2014.
MAOA genotype, childhood maltreatment, and their interaction in the
etiology of adult antisocial behaviors. Biological Psychiatry 75:25–30. [RBF]
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 108(4):814.
———. 2012. The righteous mind: why good people are divided by politics and
religion. New York: Vintage.
Haidt, Jonathan, and Jesse Graham. 2006. Planet of the Durkheimians, where
community, authority, and sacredness are foundations of morality. SSRN.

697
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_idp980844 (accessed January 3, 2017).
Haidt, Jonathan, and Craig Joseph. 2004. Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus 133(4):55–66.
———. 2007. The moral mind: how ﬁve sets of innate intuitions guide the
development of many culture-speciﬁc virtues, and perhaps even modules.
In The innate mind. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen
Stich, eds. Pp. 367–391. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2011. How moral foundations theory succeeded in building on
sand: a response to Suhler and Churchland. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23(9):2117–2122. [RBF]
Harris, Sam. 2010. The moral landscape: how science can determine human
values. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Hartwell, Michael. 2010. We’re losing a science. In Young, hip and conservative.
http://www.younghipandconservative.com/search?updated-minp2010-01-01T
00:00:00-05:00&updated-maxp2011-01-01T00:00:00-05:00&max-resultsp50
(accessed November 10, 2016).
Hatemi, Peter K., Sarah E. Medland, Robert Klemmensen, Sven Oskarsson,
Levente Littvay, Christopher T. Dawes, Brad Verhulst, et al. 2014. Genetic
inﬂuences on political ideologies: twin analyses of 19 measures of political
ideologies from ﬁve democracies and genome-wide ﬁndings from three
populations. Behavior Genetics 44(3):282–294.
Hibbing, John R., Kevin B. Smith, and John R. Alford. 2013. Predisposed:
liberals, conservatives, and the biology of political differences. New York:
Routledge.
Horowitz, David. 1999. I, Rigoberta Menchu, liar. Salon Magazine. January 12,
1999.
Horowitz, Mark, and Robert Hughes. 2017. Political identity and economists’ perceptions of capitalist crises. Review of Radical Political Economics
50(1)173–193.
Horowitz, Mark, William Yaworsky, and Kenneth Kickham. Whither the blank
slate? a report on the reception of evolutionary biological ideas among sociological theorists. Sociological Spectrum 34(6):489–509.
Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer. 1999. Mother nature. London: Chatto & Windus.
Jonason, Peter K., and David P. Schmitt. 2016. Quantifying common criticisms of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary Psychological Science 2(3):177–
188.
Jost, John T. 2009. “Elective afﬁnities”: on the psychological bases of left-right
differences. Psychological Inquiry 20(2–3):129–141.
Kendzior, Sarah. 2012. The closing of American academia. Al Jazeera. https://
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/2012820102749246453.html.
Kimmel, Michael. 2004. The gendered society: sociological perspective on sex
and gender. London: Oxford University Press.
Lehrer, Brian. 2010. Anthropology: science of humanity? The Brian Lehrer
Show. December 10, 2010. http://www.wnyc.org/story/104057–anthropology
-science-or-humanity/ (accessed May 4, 2016).
Lizot, Jacques, and Sara Dart. 1994. On warfare: an answer to NA Chagnon.
American Ethnologist 21(4):845–862. [DPF/GS]
Lyon, Stephen. 2008. Announcing the new SAS. Anthropology News, February
2008. https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1525/an.2008.49
.2.50.1. [PNP]
Marcus, Gary. 2004. The birth of the mind. New York: Basic.
Marcus, George E., and Michael M. Fischer. 1996. Anthropology as cultural
critique: an experimental moment in the human sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Miklikowska, M., and D. P. Fry. 2012. Natural born nonkillers: a critique of the
killers have-more-kids idea. In Nonkilling psychology. Daniel J. Christie and
Joám Evans Pim, eds. Pp. 43–70. Honolulu: Center for Global Nonkilling.
[DPF/GS]
Mooney, Christopher. 2012. The Republican brain: the science of why they
deny science—and reality. New York: Wiley.
———. 2014. The origin of ideology. Washington Monthly. http://www.wash
ingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/on_political_books
/the_origin_of_ideology049295.php?pagepall (accessed October 15, 2016).
Moore, J. H. 1990. The reproductive success of Cheyenne war chiefs: a contrary case to Chagnon’s Yanomamö. Current Anthropology 31:322–330.
[DPF/GS]
Moore, Mark. 2018. Giuliani: “truth isn’t truth.” New York Post. https://
nypost.com/2018/08/19/giuliani-truth-isnt-truth/. [WJ]
Nave, Gideon, Colin Camerer, and Michael McCullough. 2015. Does oxytocin
increase trust in humans? a critical review of research. Perspectives of Psychological Science 10:772–789. [RBF]

This content downloaded from 129.113.053.071 on November 11, 2019 09:25:50 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

698

Current Anthropology

Patai, Daphne. 2001. Whose truth? iconicity and accuracy in the world of testimonial literature. In The Rigoberta Menchú controversy. Arturo Arias, ed.
Pp. 270–287. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Pinker, Steven. 2011. The better angels of our nature: why violence has declined.
New York: Penguin.
———. 2016. The blank slate: the modern denial of human nature. New York:
Penguin.
Pratt, Mary Louise. 2001. I, Rigoberta Menchú and the “culture wars.” In The
Rigoberta Menchú controversy. Arturo Arias, ed. Pp. 29–48. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Risch, Neil, Richard Herrell, Thomas Lehner, Kung-Yee Liang, Lindon Eaves,
Josephine Hoh, Andrea Griem, Maria Kovacs, Jurg Ott, and Kathleen Ries
Merikangas. 2009. Interaction between the serotonin transporter gene
(5-HTTLPR), stressful life events, and risk of depression. Journal of the
American Medical Association 301:2462–2471. [RBF]
Rohter, Larry. 1998. Special report: tarnished laureate: Nobel winner accused of
stretching truth in her autobiography. New York Times, December 5, 1998.
Rosenberg, John S. 2010. Rigoberta’s revenge: the implosion of anthropology.
Minding the campus. http://www.mindingthecampus.org/2010/12/rigobertas
_revenge_the_implosi/ (accessed April 30, 2016).
Ryan, Christopher, and Cacilda Jethá. 2010. Sex at dawn: the prehistoric origins of
modern sexuality. New York: Harper & Row.
Sahlins, Marshall. 2000. Jungle fever. The Washington Post. https://www.washing
tonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/2000/12/10/jungle-fever/e8b757ae
-b365-4632-8f04-3d9e61371ed7/?utm_termp.f2e9a4961dd7 (accessed October 15, 2016).
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1995. The primacy of the ethical: propositions for a
militant anthropology. Current Anthropology 36(3):409–440.
Segerstrale, Ullica. 2000. Defenders of the truth: the battle for science in the
sociobiology debate and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shankman, Paul. 2009. The trashing of Margaret Mead: anatomy of an anthropological controversy. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Shweder, Richard A. 2000. What about “female genital mutilation?” and why
understanding culture matters in the ﬁrst place. Daedalus 129(4):209–232.
Smith Carol A. 2001. Why write an exposé of Rigoberta Menchú? In The
Rigoberta Menchú controversy. Arturo Arias, ed. Pp. 141–155. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.

Volume 60, Number 5, October 2019

Sommer, Doris. 2001. Las Casas’s lies and other language games. In The Rigoberta
Menchú controversy. Arturo Arias, ed. Pp. 237–250. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
Starn, Orin. 2015. Writing culture and the life of anthropology. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Stocking, George W. Jr. 1995. Delimiting anthropology: historical reﬂections on
the boundaries of a boundless discipline. Social Research 62(4):933–966.
Stoll, David. 1999. Rigoberta Menchú and the story of all poor Guatemalans. New
foreword by Elizabeth Burgos. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Štrkalj, Goran. 2007. The status of the race concept in contemporary biological
anthropology: a review. Anthropologist 9(1):3–78.
Suhler, Christopher, and Patricia Churchland. 2011. Can innate, modular
“foundations” explain morality? challenges for Haidt’s moral foundation theory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23:2103–2116. [RBF]
Tierney, Patrick. 2000. Darkness in El Dorado: how scientists and journalists have
devastated the Amazon. New York: Norton.
Travis, Cheryl Brown. 2003. Evolution, gender, and rape. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press. [RBF]
Wade, Nicholas. 2010. Anthropology a science? statement deepens a rift. New
York Times, December 10, 2010.
———. 2015. A troublesome inheritance: genes, race, and human history. New
York: Penguin.
Wagner, Jennifer K. Joon-Ho Yu, Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe, Tanya M. Harrell, Michael J. Bamshad, and Charmaine D. Royal. 2016. Anthropologists’ views
on race, ancestry, and genetics. American Journal of Physical Anthropology
162(2):318–327.
Weber, Max. 2009 (1917). From Max Weber: essays in sociology. Abingdon-onThames, UK: Routledge.
Wood, Peter. 2010. Anthropology association rejecting science. Chronicle of
Higher Education, November 29, 2010.http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/inno
vations/anthropology-association-rejecting-science/27936 (accessed April 15,
2016).
Wrong, Dennis H. 1961. The oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology. American Sociological Review 26(2):183–193.
Yaworsky, W., M. Horowitz, and K. Kickham. 2015. Gender and politics among
anthropologists in the units of selection debate. Biological Theory 10(2):145–
155.

This content downloaded from 129.113.053.071 on November 11, 2019 09:25:50 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

